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Note
English-Only Rules and "Innocent" Employers:
Clarifying National Origin Discrimination and
Disparate Impact Theory Under Title VII
Recently an increasing number of employers have adopted
"English-only" rules that restrict employees' use of languages
other than English in the workplace.1 Many states also have
declared English the official language of the state.2 Although
employers advance English-only rules as necessary for business
purposes3 and legislators promote official-English amendments
as necessary for the preservation of the English language,4 non-
native speakers of English may view such actions with fear and
distrust - as evidence of discrimination.5 Although employers
may adopt such rules "innocently," without any discriminatory
intent, English-only rules nevertheless may constitute illegal
discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.6
Recent Supreme Court decisions7 draw into question the
measure of protection afforded employees in the workplace8
1. See infra note 22 (discussing recent employee challenges to English-
only rules in workplace).
2. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing official-Eng-
lish amendments).
3. See infra notes 112-14, 139-49 and accompanying text (discussing prof-
fered business purposes).
4. See B. PiATr, LONLY ENGLISH? LAW AND LANGUAGE PoLIcY IN THE
UNITED STATES 20-22 (to be published by University of New Mexico Press,
Mar. 1990) (manuscript on file with the Minnesota Law Review) (discussing of-
ficial-English movement). See also infra note 21 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing official-English movement's goals).
5. Plaintiffs belonging to protected national origin groups have chal-
lenged these rules as national origin discrimination. See infra notes 22, 95.
See also Ingwerson, Push for Ofjfiial English on Ballot in 3 States, Christian
Sci. Monitor, Oct. 27, 1988, at 5, col. 2 (noting Hispanic view of official-English
amendments as form of "ethnic put-down").
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
7. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as
moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115
(1989).
8. See Wermiel, Standards for Proving Bias Charges are Toughened in
High Court Rulings, Wall St. J., June 6, 1989, at 30, col. 1 (stating that "effect
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under the equal employment opportunity provisions in Title
VII. The Court recently vacated as moot a Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision that invalidated an employer's English-only
rule under Title VII 9 The Supreme Court also recently refor-
mulated the standard for judging the validity of employment
practices under Title VII.'0 This decision reallocates the bur-
den of persuasion and reduces the burden of proof of business
justification for the employer, making discrimination more dif-
ficult for the employee to prove."
This Note argues that even in light of the recent Supreme
Court decisions, Title VII protects employees from "innocent"
employers who institute English-only rules with insufficient
business justifications. This Note further argues that the defi-
nition of national origin should include linguistic characteris-
tics, and that English-only rules, by proscribing certain
linguistic characteristics, presumptively have a disparate impact
on certain national origin groups. Based on these arguments,
this Note demonstrates that many English-only rules violate Ti-
tle VII as national origin discrimination. Part I of this Note ex-
amines the relationship between Title VII and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of National Origin,' 2 the historical and
recent developments in the disparate impact theory of liability
under Title VII, and the judicial application of disparate impact
theory to English-only rules. Part II analyzes the Supreme
Court's new formulation of the disparate impact standard and
illustrates how courts should apply it to English-only rules.
Although perhaps tempted to defer to employers' business jus-
tifications for English-only rules, courts nevertheless must con-
duct a "reasoned review"'13 under the new standard to
determine the validity of such justifications. This Note con-
cludes that a proper application of the new disparate impact
standard will preclude the use of most facially neutral language
restrictions that create burdensome conditions of employment
for affected national origin groups.
will be devastating" on lawsuits that challenge hiring and promotion practices
with discriminatory effects).
9. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as
moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
10. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26 (1989).
11. Id. at 2124-27.
12. See infra note 42.
13. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (stating that "[tihe touchstone of this inquiry
is a reasoned review of the employer's justification for his use of the chal-
lenged practice").
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I. SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR NATIONAL
ORIGIN GROUPS
The increasingly multicultural and multilingual nature of
the United States14 has engendered growing discontent within a
large segment of the population.15 Some people perceive the in-
crease in the size and the public presence of the Hispanic and
Asian populations16 as a threat to "United States culture" and
14. Hispanic and Asian cultures have greatly influenced "U.S. culture" in
many areas, including food, fashion, music, and architecture. See Pomice, It's a
whole nuevo mundo out there, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 15, 1989, at 45
(stating that "mainstream media [is] becoming more Latinized"). The trend
has been to accommodate non-speakers of English by offering services in vari-
ous languages. For example, Pacific Bell Telephone Company soon will dis-
tribute promotional materials in nine languages. Pacific Bell to Expand
Multilingual Services, U.S. ENG. UPDATE, July-Aug. 1988, at 6. AT&T now of-
fers its customers long distance assistance in Spanish. Roundup, U.S. ENG. UP-
DATE, July-Aug. 1988, at 1. NBC produced the first Spanish language TV and
radio advertisement. Id. Other languages appear in billboard advertisements
as well. See B. PIATr, supra note 4, at 27; see also Lipman, Marketers Turn to
Promotions to Attract Hispanic Consumers, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1989, at B6,
col. 3 (stating that marketers spent $550 million in advertising to Hispanic pop-
ulation in 1988).
15. Two organizations, U.S. English and the Federation for American Im-
migration Reform (FAIR), are particularly vocal. For a discussion of U.S.
English, see infra note 18. FAIR's response to the perceived immigrant assim-
ilation crisis focuses on tougher immigration laws and lower immigration quo-
tas. Cox, 'English Only'r A Legal Polyglot, NAT'L LAW J., Oct. 26, 1987, at 10,
col. 4. See also infra note 21 (discussing U.S. English's response).
16. Three hundred thousand Hispanic immigrants entered the United
States in 1987. Schmalz, Hispanic Influx Spurs Step to Bolster English, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 2. As of 1985, there were at least 13.2 million
Spanish speakers in the United States. B. PIATr, supra note 4, at 26. This is a
fourfold increase since 1960. Id. While the number of immigrants from Eu-
rope has decreased, the number from Asia and Mexico has increased. From
1961 to 1970, 135,000 immigrants came from China and Japan, 443,000 from
Mexico, and 1,239,000 from Europe. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 10 (1988). In sharp
contrast, from 1971 to 1980, 250,000 immigrants came from China and Japan,
637,000 from Mexico and only 801,000 from Europe. Id In 1986, 43,000 immi-
grants came from China and Japan, 67,000 from Mexico, and 63,000 from Eu-
rope. 1I
At the state level, estimates indicate that by the year 2000, 45% of Califor-
nia's population will be composed of racial and ethnic minorities. Karst, Paths
to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REV. 303, 304
n.6 (1986). In 1970, 5.9% of the population in Florida was Hispanic. Today, the
figure is 12%. Hispanics compose 35% of the population in Miami, and 25% in
both Denver and Tucson. Schmalz, supra, at Al, col. 2, B8, col. 3. Monterey
Park, California, provides a striking example of the change in the population
makeup. In 1960, 85% of the residents were Anglo, whereas in 1985, 40% were
Asian, 37% Latino, 22% Anglo, and 1% Black. Ward, Language Problem
Arises in City, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 1985, at VAR-5, col. 1-2 (Orange Cty. ed.).
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to the English language.1 7 Proponents 8 of state19 and federal 2°
17. "Those who react to cultural differences with fear or anger generally
espouse nativist policies designed to repress the differences by excluding the
'others' from the country, by forcing them to conform to the norms of the
dominant culture, or by relegating them to a subordinate status in society."
Karst, supra note 16, at 311. See also Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a
Human Right to Language, 23 Hous. L. REv. 885, 894-95 (1986) (arguing that
monolinguals fear languages they do not understand and are hostile to recog-
nition of right to use languages other than English). The fear that "Ameri-
cans" will feel like outsiders in their own country prompted passage of a city
ordinance in Monterey Park, California, requiring businesses, primarily Asian
restaurants and shops, to include the roman alphabet in signs. Ward, supra
note 16, at 5, col. 2.
"Distrust of the members of a different cultural group flows from fear,
not just of the unknown, but the fear that outsiders threaten our own accul-
turated views of the natural order of society." Karst, supra note 16, at 309.
Cultural diversity, however, has never seriously threatened the survival of the
American nation. Id. at 362. "It is hard to argue that linguistic separatism is
really a threat to America, which is at once one of the most ethnically hetero-
geneous and linguistically homogeneous nations in the world." It's UnAmeri-
can, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 1988, at 35. See also Ingwerson, supra note 5, at
5, col. 3 (noting that opponents of English-only movement state that "primacy
of English is nowhere threatened").
At the same time, Americans recognize that monolingualism puts the
United States at a distinct disadvantage in international settings and that to
function more effectively, the United States needs more English speakers flu-
ent in foreign languages. In fact, "[s]everal years ago, the paucity of bright, bi-
lingual Americans forced the State Department to drop a requirement that
candidates for the foreign service be fluent in a second language. The reason
was that too many talented people had to be passed over because of the re-
quirement." Gedda, Americans' Lack of Foreign-language Skills Makes it
Hard to Find Interpreters, Mpls. Star Tribune, Jan. 8, 1989, at 4E, col. 3. See
also Piatt, supra, at 900 (stating that failure to produce functional bilinguals is
a "crippling factor" in dealing with other nations); Rothberg, Governors Urged
to Push International Education, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Feb. 26, 1989, at 10A,
col. 1 (reporting that Governors' Task Force on International Education noted
lack of foreign language ability and advocated children learning foreign lan-
guages beginning in first grade).
18. One such proponent is U.S. English, a non-profit organization with
350,000 dues-paying members. Ferguson, The Bilingual Battle, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 29, 1988, at 22, col. 4. Former U.S. Senator S.I. Hayakawa founded U.S.
English and Linda Chavez, a former Reagan-appointed staff director of the
Civil Rights Commission, heads the organization. Id. at col. 5. U.S. English, a
key organization in the official-English movement, publicly expresses its dis-
content with and fear of the erosion of the English language and Anglo cul-
ture. Wright, U.S. English, San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chron., Mar.
20, 1983, at B9, col. 1. The organization lobbies for a federal constitutional
amendment declaring English the official language of the United States. Id.
U.S. English also seeks to restrict government funding for bilingual education
and limit such education to short-term transitional programs. Id. The official-
English movement also supports official-English constitutional amendments at
the state level and uses such amendments to justify abolishing multilingual
ballots and limiting bilingual education. See generally Note, "Official Eng-
lish'" Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100
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constitutional amendments that declare English the official lan-
HARV. L. REv. 1345 (1987) [hereinafter Offwial English] (arguing that state
declarations of English as the official language may be used to bar or disman-
tle bilingual programs). In the first election after California passed its official-
English amendment in 1986, U.S. English was not able to challenge the op-
tional bilingual ballots as unconstitutional because, although voters could re-
quest Spanish ballots, no one had done so in 20 years. Cox, supra note 15, at
10, col. 1.
19. At the local level, U.S. English is behind the grassroots movement to
conduct petition drives to put official-English amendments on state ballots.
Cox, supra note 15, at 1, col. 3. U.S. English claims that such amendments will
prohibit actions that diminish the supremacy of English and will require state
legislatures to take steps to preserve and enhance the use of English. Id at 9,
col. 2. In 1988, U.S. English collected over 210,000 signatures in Arizona, far
exceeding the number needed to put the official-English measure on the bal-
lot. Arizona Petition Drive A Success: Breaks State Record for Signatures,
U.S. ENG. UPDATE, July-Aug. 1988, at 1.
To date, 17 states have declared English the official language of the state.
In 1990 Alabama voters will consider a state constitutional amendment
designating English the official language of the state. See 1989 Ala. Acts 461
(instructing the secretary of state to place an "English as official language of
state" amendment on the June 5, 1990 statewide ballot). In the 1988 election,
Arizona, Colorado, and Florida adopted state constitutional amendments to
make English the official language of the state. File Facts, U.S. ENG. UPDATE,
Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 3-4. Illinois declared "American" its official language in
1923. Offjcial English, supra note 18, at 1346 n.7. Other states that have de-
clared English their official language include Arkansas, California, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. B. PIATr, supra note 4, at 22.
In 1989, legislators in 18 states introduced official-English bills. These in-
clude Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. WESTLAW, State
Net, BILLCAST. In 1986, twelve states introduced official-English bills: Ala-
bama, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Ofjlcial English, supra
note 18, at 1346.
Other states, however, have defeated proposals to make English the offi-
cial language. These include Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. Cox, supra
note 15, at 10, col. 3. In February, 1989, a bill was introduced in the Arizona
legislature seeking to place a referendum on the 1990 general election ballot to
repeal the 1988 official-English amendment. WESTLAW, State Net, BILL-
CAST.
The official-English movement also has influenced local communities.
Prior to 1986, Fillmore, Los Altos, and Monterey Park, California, enacted lo-
cal official-English ordinances to prohibit non-English signs on stores. Cox,
supra note 15, at 9, col. 3.
20. Every year since 1981, Congress has considered a Constitutional Eng-
lish Language Amendment. Asian Law Caucus Reporter, Aug. 1988, at 1, col.
2. Although the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution has only
heard the bill once, the Subcommittee will hold additional hearings. Id. at 1,
col. 3. In 1989, four resolutions were introduced in the House proposing to
amend the Constitution to establish English as the official language of the
United States. H.R.J. Res. 23, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H39 (daily
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guage argue that such amendments are necessary to encourage
clear communication and the assimilation of immigrants. 21 As
more non-native speakers of English enter the workforce, em-
ployers increasingly institute rules requiring employees to
speak only English in the workplace.22 Because the vast major-
ed. Jan. 3, 1989); H.R.J. Res. 48, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H58
(daily ed. Jan. 4, 1989); H.R.J. Res. 79, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC.
H87 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1989); H.R.J. Res. 81, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG.
REC. H87 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1989).
21. See Schmalz, supra note 16, at A1, col. 2. One such proponent, U.S.
English, is particularly concerned about the assimilation of Hispanic immi-
grants. Wright, supra note 18, at B9, col. 1. U.S. English claims its purpose is
to counterbalance a perceived crisis created by an anti-assimilation movement.
Id. U.S. English believes that leaders of the Hispanic bloc, among others, re-
sist attempts to learn English, reject the "melting-pot concept, resist assimila-
tion as a betrayal of their ancestral culture, and demand government funding
to maintain their ethnic institutions." Id. One goal of the official-English
amendments is to encourage immigrants to attend adult English classes. Cox,
Citizen Movement Seeks to Proclaim English 'Of-fcial," A Matter of Symbols,
L.A. Daily J., Apr. 25, 1986, at 1, col. 2. Supporters of these amendments view
the English language as the "cultural glue" that will unite the country. Id. at
20, col. 4. U.S. English claims that a person's culture should be maintained pri-
vately in the home, not in public. Beers, 'Us' and 'Them': Push to Make Eng-
lish 'Official' Goes Beyond the Issue of Language, L.A. Daily J., July 25, 1986,
at 4, col. 3.
In response, opponents of U.S. English, such as the Mexican-American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the National Council of La
Raza, and Chinese for Affirmative Action, argue that immigrants and refugees
do know the value of the English language, but that restrictions on native lan-
guage use will not accelerate the learning process. Cox, supra, at 1, col. 2.
These groups believe that groups like U.S. English invite racism and bigotry,
id., and only create divisiveness. Beers, supra, at 4, col. 3.
Official-English amendments are not necessary to encourage the use of
English. "[Tihere is little evidence that Spanish speakers cling to their lan-
guage any more fervently than did previous groups of immigrants." It's
UnAmerican, THE ECoNOMIST, Oct. 22, 1988, at 35. Studies show that Spanish
speaking families in Miami are learning English as fast as previous immigrant
groups. Ingwerson, supra note 5, at 5, col. 3. In fact, it is the continuing immi-
gration of Hispanics that gives the impression that they are not learning Eng-
lish. Schmalz, supra note 16, at Al, col. 2; Note, The Proposed English
Language Amendment Shield or Sword?, 3 YALE L. & PoL'y REv. 519, 529
(1985) [hereinafter Shield or Sword].
In addition, these opponents of U.S. English view assimilation as being
equivalent to Anglicization and refuse to accept Anglo culture as their primary
culture. Beers, supra, at 4, col. 5. Henry Der of the San Francisco-based Chi-
nese for Affirmative Action argues that U.S. English preys on people's anxiety
over the large number of immigrants and takes advantage of people's intoler-
ance for differences. Id.
22. Many employers have instituted English-only rules that restrict em-
ployees' use of non-English languages in the workplace. Telephone interview
with Theresa Bustillos, supervising trial attorney for the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (Los Angeles office) (Oct. 31, 1989). The in-
crease in employers' use of English-only rules, however, is not matched by an
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increase in court decisions involving English-only rules because most claimants
resolve their cases before reaching trial. Id. For example, in 1984, 1985, and
1986, four monolingual Spanish speakers filed separate complaints with the
EEOC against the Salvation Army in Los Angeles for imposing a rule that re-
quired employees to speak English on the work premises during work hours.
Id. In 1987, the EEOC filed a complaint in district court, but resolved the dis-
pute with the employer shortly thereafter. EEOC v. Salvation Army, No. CV
87-07846 DWW (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 20, 1987) (stipulation settlement and dis-
missal, Mar. 10, 1988). The employer withdrew the English-only rule and re-
moved the disciplinary notices from the employees' files. Bustillos interview,
supra. The rule required employees to speak English while talking to custom-
ers, supervisors, and other employees. Id. Whether the rule included lunches
was unclear. Id. For repeated and willful violations of the rule, employees
were subject to immediate discipline and possible discharge. Id. For repeated
and inadvertent violations, the employer evaluated the employee's English
language capability to determine whether the employee could function satis-
factorily in the job. Id. See also Murphy, Salvation Army Sued Over 'English-
only' Rule, L.A. Times, Nov. 27, 1987, § 2, at 1, col. I (discussing EEOC suit
against Salvation Army).
More employers have implemented English-only rules recently because of
the increasing Latino and Asian population in Los Angeles and the 1986 Cali-
fornia constitutional amendment making English the official language. Tele-
phone interview with Thomas Olmos, regional attorney for the EEOC (Los
Angeles office) (Nov. 1, 1989). The EEOC is analyzing, for purposes of litiga-
tion, a major national retailer's English-only rule. Id. The case is unusual be-
cause the rule has been in effect since 1974 and is not in writing. Id. The rule
requires employees to speak only English during working hours. Id. The em-
ployer had threatened several office typists with discipline for speaking other
languages. Id. The employer claims the rule is essential for allocating work
fairly, supervising employees, conducting training, enhancing production, and
maintaining good employee morale. Id.
In 1989, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Asian Pa-
cific American Legal Center filed a complaint against Pomona Valley Hospital
Medical Center on behalf of its Filipina nurses. Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley
Hosp. Medical Center, No. CV 89-4299 ER(JRX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 18, 1989).
The hospital instituted an English-only rule in 1988, but enforced it only
against seven or eight of the hospital's nurses. Telephone interview with
Kathryn Imahara, staff attorney for the Asian Pacific American Legal Center
(Los Angeles office) (Oct. 30, 1989). The hospital allowed the use of Spanish
and Korean, but prevented the Fiipina nurses from speaking Tagalog, their
native language, on breaks, in the cafeteria, and on the phone. Id. Although a
spokesperson for the hospital denied that such a policy existed, the nurses' use
of Tagalog resulted in negative personnel evaluations that could possibly result
in termination. Id.
An employee filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in 1988
against the Executive Life Insurance Company in California challenging an
English-only rule. Charge no. 340-89-0294, Dec. 22, 1988.. The written rule re-
quired employees to speak English at all times and targeted employees who
spoke Tagalog or Chinese. Imahara interview, supra. The EEOC settled the
case with the employer in January, 1989. Id. The employer issued a policy
statement that allowed employees to speak any language in the workplace. Id.
Several other hospitals have English-only rules that require employees to pay
251 when caught violating the rule. Id. In reality, these hospitals enforce the
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ity of United States citizens speak only English,2 such lan-
guage restrictions affect most profoundly United States citizens
whose primary language is not English.2
Opponents of English-only rules advocate several constitu-
tional and statutory theories to protect employees adversely
affected by language restrictions in the workplace.2 Constitu-
rules almost exclusively against speakers of Tagalog and rarely against speak-
ers of other languages. Id.
In 1988, an employee filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
against the University of California-San Francisco, for instituting an English-
only rule and for reprimanding employees who spoke to each other in Tagalog,
Spanish, or any language other than English. Charge no. 370-88-0851, June 28,
1988 (conciliation agreement reached June 27, 1989). In June, 1989, the EEOC
negotiated a settlement with the University, whereby the University restored
a terminated employee to her former position and guaranteed an end to lan-
guage discrimination in the workplace. Imahara interview, supra.
Some employers have expressly forbidden employees from speaking Span-
ish on the job. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); see also infra notes 100-116 and accompanying text
(discussing Garcia). Other employers have banned non-English languages at
all times or at all times except during breaks and lunches. For examples of
rules that apply at all times, see Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1036
(9th Cir. 1988) (noting rule as originally promulgated applied at all times), va-
cated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989); Flores v. Hartford Police Dep't, 25 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 180, 185-86 (D. Conn. 1981) (prohibiting other lan-
guages at police academy); Commission Decision No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1820, 1821 (EEOC 1981) (requiring only English at work). For an
example of a limited English-only rule, see Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036 (Eng-
lish-only rule as litigated); infra notes 123-49 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Gutierrez). For a discussion of English-only rules in the workplace, see B.
PiATT, supra note 4, at 66-73.
23. In 1980, the population of the United States was 210,247,455. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, Table
256 (1984). At that time, 187,187,415 people, 89% of the U.S. population, spoke
only English at home and 23,060,040 spoke a language other than English at
home. Id.
24. Based on Census Bureau statistics, 11% of U.S. adults speak a lan-
guage other than English at home. Id. Less that one percent, .57%, of the to-
tal population cannot speak English at all. Id. Of those speaking a language
other than English at home, more than 11 million speak Spanish and more
than 1.4 million speak Asian languages (Chinese, Japanese, Korean,
Vietnamese). Id. Of course, there are also some bilingual native speakers of
English who will be affected by an English-only rule, but the percentage is
very small. See infra note 228.
25. These include two constitutional bases for protecting language minori-
ties, one definitional basis, and several statutory bases. For a discussion of
equal protection analysis, see infra note 28. For a discussion of fundamental
rights analysis, see infra note 29.
One commentator advocates broadening the definition of national origin
to extend protection to cultural characteristics that manifest cultural identity
because such characteristics may be used to discriminate against non-assimi-
lated individuals within a given national origin. Note, A Trait-Based Approach
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tional theories have failed even though courts have taken judi-
cial notice of past discrimination against national origin groups,
particularly Hispanics and Chinese,26 and despite scholarship
demonstrating the propensity of language restrictions to sup-
press these groups.27 Courts have never recognized linguistic
minorities as a suspect class under equal protection analysis,2
to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164, 1166-67 & n.13
(1985). He argues that the term "national origin" should not be limited solely
to the country from which one or one's ancestors emigrated because a person's
lack of assimilation, as reflected in certain cultural characteristics, is eqvilly
indicative of national origin. Id. These cultural characteristics not only in-
clude the obvious characteristics such as accent, skin pigment, and surname,
but also personal appearance and knowledge of U.S. history. Id. Without tak-
ing these characteristics into account, he argues, prejudice against certain na-
tional origins and against certain members within national origin groups may
be masked and discrimination may go unchecked. Id.
Finally, courts have used 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985(c) to pro-
tect national origin groups from discriminatory employment practices. See e.g.,
Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752, 755 (D. Or. 1973) (holding policy
that prohibited tavern patrons from speaking foreign language invalid). But
see Vasquez v. McAllen Bag & Supply Co., 660 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding English speaking requirement for truck drivers valid), cert denied,
458 U.S. 1122 (1982).
26. See Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1521 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating
"courts have long recognized the discriminatory treatment inflicted on Chi-
nese and Hispanic people"), vacated for mootness, 484 U.S. 806 (1987); see also
Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 852 F.2d 1186, withdrawn, re-reported at 863
F.2d 1407, 1419 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that if necessary to decide case, court
"would consider the propriety of taking judicial notice of the pervasive dis-
crimination against Hispanics in California"), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1534
(1989).
27. Historically, language restrictions have been used to dominate minor-
ity language groups. See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Freedom from Dis-
crimination in Choice of Language and International Human Rights, 1976 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 151, 153 [hereinafter McDougal] (quoting Dr. J. J. Lador-Lederer:
"[s]uffocation of language has always been part of [the] policies of domination
and the struggle for its maintenance was always a precondition for any polit-
ical movement of liberation").
In addition, because of language's unique ability to unify as well as divide
and suppress people, its use should be protected from abuses by careful
scrutiny:
Language is a uniquely powerful instrument in unifying a diverse
population and in involving individuals and subgroups in the national
system... [but] some of the very features of language that give it this
power under some circumstances may, under other circumstances be-
come major sources of disintegration and internal conflict within a na-
tional system.
Id. at 160 (quoting Kelman, Language as Aid and Barrier to Involvement in
the National System, in CAN LANGUAGE BE PLANNED? 21 (1971), reprinted in
2 ADVANCES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 185 (J. Fishman ed. 1972)); see
also Shield or Sword, supra note 21, at 533-39 (discussing language as an offen-
sive weapon).
28. See Offwial English, supra note 18, at 1354 n.64 (citing cases rejecting
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nor have they recognized a constitutional right to speak a lan-
guage other than English.29
A. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTs ACT
Although linguistic minorities lack constitutional protec-
tion, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act3° provides a measure
quasi-suspect status for language minorities). But see Asian Am. Business
Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (upholding
use of strict scrutiny test in equal protection claim that language regulations
on business signs discriminated based on national origin). Some scholars have
proposed constitutional protection for language rights by treating language mi-
norities as a quasi-suspect class for equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Official
English, supra note 18, at 1353-55 (arguing that language minorities, non-na-
tive English speakers, meet requirements of "discrete and insular minorities"
because they are easily identified, have suffered a history of discrimination,
and are politically powerless). Because language goes to the essence of one's
identity, language classifications can only be invidious and arbitrary. McDou-
gal, supra note 27, at 158.
29. No court has confronted this issue and rejected such a constitutional
claim. See Offj'ial English, supra note 18, at 1347-52 (tracing the history of
language policies and judicial attempts to recognize language minority rights).
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, there does appear to be a
constitutional basis upon which a court could establish individual language
rights. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (protecting right
to teach language other than English and right of parents to have children
taught language other than English). The Court stated.
[Tihe individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those
who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on
the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by
methods which conflict with the Constitution-a desirable end cannot
be promoted by prohibited means.
Id. at 401. See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) (requiring school
to rectify language deficiency problems for children who speak only Chinese);
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 528 (1926) (according right to use Chi-
nese to keep account books); United States ex rel Negron v. New York, 434
F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir. 1970) (requiring simultaneous interpretation at court pro-
ceedings). See generally B. PIATr, supra note 4, at 127-39 (discussing potential
sources of a minority language right); Piatt, supra note 17, at 885 (same).
Some scholars argue that the "emergence of the principle of equal citizen-
ship" in the twentieth century is based on constitutional values of dignity and
respect. Karst, supra note 16, at 337-38. The "principle of equal citizenship
protects against stigma, the imposition of badges of inferiority based on a per-
son's race or membership in an ethnic or religious group." Id. at 338. These
are the same values involved in language rights. A Constitution that protects
individualism and egalitarianism should also protect the right to express one-
self in the language one chooses.
30. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987));
see also Vaas, Title VII Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 431
(1965) (reviewing history of Title VII's enactment); see generally UNITED
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of statutory protection.31 Congress enacted Title VII, and
amended it in 1972,32 to outlaw employment discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.33 Con-
gress also enacted Title VII to achieve equality in employment
opportunity and employment conditions, to promote hiring on
the basis of proper qualifications, and to remove barriers that in
the past favored white male employees.34
Title VII does not explicitly define the term "national ori-
gin" or the scope of protection it provides for national origin
groups. In the context of the statute, however, national origin
generally is understood to mean the country from which a per-
STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIsSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 (1986) [hereinafter LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF TTLS VII AND XI].
31. Title VII provides a statutory basis that has successfully protected lan-
guage minorities and the right to speak languages other than English in the
workplace. For examples of cases in which Title VII protected the right to
speak a language other than English, see infra notes 98-99, 119, 123 and accom-
panying text.
32. In 1972, Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
(EEO Act), amending Title VII. The EEO Act reworded 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(2) by adding "or applicants for employment." See generally BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAiRS, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972
(1973) [hereinafter EEO ACr] (providing guide to changes made by 1972
amendments and excerpts of legislative history).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, and states in part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
Congress intended to assure equality by prohibiting employers from mak-
ing decisions on the basis of race, national origin, color, religion, or sex that
may adversely affect employees. See Carino v. University of Okla. Bd. of Re-
gents, 750 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir. 1984).
34. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (dis-
cussing Title VII's purpose). During the Senate debate on the House-approved
bill, Senator Clark, the Senate Floor Manager, responded to a question about
the interference with an employer's right to hire based on qualifications, stat-
ing "[t]o discriminate is to make distinctions or differences in the treatment of
employees, and [such distinctions] are prohibited only if they are based on any
one of the five forbidden criteria (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin);
any other criteria or qualification is untouched by this bill." 110 CoNG. REC.
7218 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark).
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son or a person's ancestors came.35 Congress deleted the word
ancestry from the final version of the Act because it considered
the term synonymous with national origin.36 The Supreme
Court confirmed this interpretation in 1973.37 There is no evi-
dence that Congress intended to define the term narrowly.38
There also is no evidence that Congress intended a narrow
scope of protection. Title VII explicitly outlaws certain employ-
ment practices that discharge, limit, or otherwise discriminate
against employees on the basis of national origin.39
As part of Title VII, Congress created the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to administer the Act.40
The EEOC has published several different guidelines interpret-
35. During the discussion of the House version, Rep. Roosevelt stated that
"national origin" means "the country from which you or your forebears came
from[sic]. You may come from Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France, or
any other country." 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964) (statement of Rep. Roosevelt).
Rep. Dent reiterated that national origin has nothing to do with color, religion,
or the race of the individual. 110 CONG. REc. 2549 (1964) (statement of Rep.
Dent).
36. Comment, Native-Born Acadians and the Equality Ideal, 46 LA. L.
REV. 1151, 1157 (1986) [hereinafter Native-Born Acadians] (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1963)).
37. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973).
38. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1040 n.12 (9th Cir. 1988)
(stating that "Title VII is a broad remedial statute that was intended to strike
at many forms of discrimination that may not be actionable under the four-
teenth amendment"), vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
39. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
See supra note 33 for a partial text of the Act.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982). When established in 1964, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission had virtually no enforcement powers. The
Commission had only the authority to receive and investigate discrimination
charges and to resolve charges through conciliation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)
(1982). See also LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI, supra note 30, at
3258-3372 (discussing historical and legislative background of Title VII).
A 1972 amendment to Title VII expanded the EEOC's enforcement pow-
ers, giving the EEOC authority to bring civil suits to eliminate unlawful em-
ployment practices. Congress granted the authority by amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4(g)(6) to allow the EEOC "to intervene in a civil action brought under
section 2000e-5 of this title by an aggrieved party against a respondent ...."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6) (1982). The purpose of the EEO Act was to establish
a quasi-judicial agency with enforcement power to implement the national pol-
icy of Title VII.
Title VII also gave the EEOC authority to issue procedural guidelines.
"The Commission shall have authority from time to time to issue, amend, or
rescind suitable procedural regulations ... ." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-12(a) (1982) (em-
phasis added). See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI, supra note 30,
at 1020. The word "procedural" was intentionally included. See id. at 1021.
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ing various aspects of the Act.41 In 1970, the EEOC published
the first Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Ori-
gin.42 Although Title VII does not explicitly authorize the
EEOC to issue such "interpretive" guidelines, the Supreme
Court has nevertheless confirmed the EEOC's authority to do
so. 43 The Supreme Court has held that guidelines consistent
with the Act and legislative history 4 deserve deference. 45 The
41. See infra notes 44-45 (Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures)
and infra note 44 (Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures).
42. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.1 (1971). The EEOC issued these Guidelines to clarify what constitutes
national origin discrimination. "The Commission is aware of the widespread
practices of discrimination on the basis of national origin, and intends to apply
the full force of law to eliminate such discrimination." Id. § 1606.1(a). "Title
VII is intended to eliminate covert as well as overt practices of discrimination
... where persons ... have been denied equal employment opportunity for
reasons which are grounded in national origin considerations." Id. § 1606.1(b).
These practices included using tests in English when English is not the test
taker's first language and denying opportunities because a person's name re-
flects a certain national origin. Id.
43. Although the EEOC is given authority to issue only procedural guide-
lines, it may be inferred that the EEOC has some power to interpret Title VII
because § 713(b) provides a "good faith defense" for employers who relied on
the EEOC's interpretation. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI,
supra note 30, at 1020. The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he EEOC
Guidelines are not administrative 'regulations' promulgated pursuant to for-
mal procedures established by the Congress. But, as this Court has heretofore
noted, they do constitute '[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by the
enforcing agency,' and consequently they are 'entitled to great deference."'
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)). See also M. PLAYER, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAw § 5.02, at 200 (stud. ed. 1988) (stating that "[tihe
third major function of the EEOC is interpretive").
44. The Court has ruled twice that certain guidelines are consistent with
congressional intent and that courts must defer to them. In 1971, the Supreme
Court upheld the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). In 1975, the Supreme
Court adopted the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975). The Court held
that employers must determine through validation studies that employment
tests are job related. Id.
45. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34. The Supreme Court found that the 1966
EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures in the racial context
were consistent with the Act and therefore accorded them great deference. Id.
at 433-36.
Because of the "consistency" requirement, the EEOC guidelines may be
subject to court interpretation and subsequent agency revision. For example,
in 1973 the Supreme Court ruled that even though EEOC guidelines were gen-
erally entitled to deference, the guidelines equating citizenship with national
origin were inconsistent with congressional intent and should not be followed.
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973). The Court noted that Con-
gress could not have intended to equate citizenship with national origin be-
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Seventh Circuit also has stated that courts should follow EEOC
guidelines unless a "cogent reason exists for non-compliance." 46
In 1980 and 1987, the EEOC published Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Because of National Origin (EEOC Guidelines) that
directly addressed English-only rules and their relation to na-
tional origin discrimination.47 The EEOC Guidelines define na-
tional origin broadly to include linguistic characteristics of
national origin groups48 and state that an individual's primary
language is an essential characteristic of national origin.49
Although promulgated in 1980, the Ninth Circuit in 1988 was
the first court to consider and apply50 the EEOC Guidelines to
cause there was no intent to reverse the long-standing practice of requiring
federal employees to be citizens. Id. at 92-94. The EEOC subsequently revised
the Guidelines to reflect the Court's holding. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(d) (1974) (stat-
ing that discrimination on basis of citizenship is not per se national origin
discrimination).
46. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 427 (7th Cir. 1978) (cit-
ing United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 430 (7th Cir. 1977)).
47. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg.
85,632, 85,634-35 (1980) (overview of 1980 Guidelines discussing English-only
rules); Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7 (1987). The purpose of the Guidelines was to explain to employers
what constitutes national origin discrimination. Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,632, 85,635 (1980). See also 29
C.F.R. §§ 1606.1, 1606.2 (1980) (further defining national origin discrimination
and scope of Title VII protection). The Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1980), further codifies the Commission's
interpretation of national origin discrimination in the context of English-only
rules. The 1987 EEOC Guidelines made no change in these provisions. See 29
C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1987).
48. The Commission defines national origin discrimination broadly to in-
clude denial of employment opportunity because of an "individual's, or his or
her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cul-
tural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1
(1987).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1987).
50. The Ninth Circuit adopted the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of National Origin in Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1039-
40 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989). Although this Note
argues that the EEOC Guidelines are consistent with congressional intent and
therefore deserve deference, infra notes 211-15 and accompanying text, the
Ninth Circuit failed to analyze whether the Guidelines actually met the consis-
tency requirement. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039-40 & n.7 (noting consistency re-
quirement in footnote only).
The Garcia court did not follow earlier EEOC rulings concerning the va-
lidity of English-only rules, because the EEOC had not issued any regulations
or general policy on English-only rules. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 n.1
(5th Cir. 1980) (upholding English-only rule confined to the workplace and
workhours), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). Garcia was decided only on the
basis of case law and Title VII. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 268. The court implied,
however, that it would have deferred to guidelines stating a general policy or a
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English-only rules.5 '
B. THEORIES OF LIABILITY TO PROVE DISCRIMINATION
Under both Title VII and the EEOC Guidelines, two theo-
ries exist by which employees may show national origin dis-
crimination:52  disparate treatment theory5 3  and disparate
impact theory.54 The Supreme Court established the disparate
standard by which to test the language prohibitions had any existed. See id. at
268 n.1.
The 1980 EEOC Guidelines, published after the 1980 Garcia decision, in-
cluded provisions dealing specifically with English-only rules. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7 (1981). The EEOC Guidelines distinguish Garcia, stating that the
Commission's concern is to protect employees from discriminatory employ-
ment practices and to remove unnecessary barriers, such as arbitrary English-
only rules. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed.
Reg. 85,632, 85,635 (1980).
51. The EEOC Guidelines create a presumption that rules requiring em-
ployees to speak English at all times in the workplace violate Title VII as na-
tional origin discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1987).
§ 1606.7 Speak-English-only rules
(a) When applied at all times. A rule requiring employees to
speak only English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome
term and condition of employment. The primary language of an indi-
vidual is often an essential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting
employees at all times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary
language or the language they speak most comfortably, disadvantages
an individual's employment opportunities on the basis of national ori-
gin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and in-
timidation based on national origin which could result in a
discriminatory working environment. Therefore, the Commission
will presume that such a rule violates Title VII and will closely scruti-
nize it.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Nonetheless, the EEOC Guidelines allow an employer to impose limited
language restrictions if business necessity justifies them:
When applied only at certain times. An employer may have a rule
requiring that employees speak only in English at certain times where
the employer can show that the rule is justified by business necessity.
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (1987).
52. "The Title VII principles of disparate treatment and adverse impact
equally apply to national origin discrimination. These Guidelines apply to all
entities covered by Title VII . . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.2 (1987). See also B.
ScHLi & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 304 n.2 (2d ed.
1983) (citing cases in which courts have considered claims under both
theories).
53. See B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 52, at 304 n.1. Disparate
treatment occurs when an employer intentionally treats people less favorably
because of characteristics such as race or national origin. Proof of motive is
critical. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (stating that proof of discriminatory motive is critical).
54. See, e.g., International Bhd., 431 U.S. at 336 n.15 (stating that disparate
impact results from "employment practices that are facially neutral in their
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treatment standard in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,s5
which requires employees alleging disparate treatment to show
that the employer intentionally discriminated against a pro-
tected class. 56 The Supreme Court first established the dispa-
rate impact standard in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.57 Under the
Griggs standard, employees alleging disparate impact must
show that a facially neutral employment practice has a dispro-
portionate impact on a group protected by Title VII.58 Because
of the difficulty courts encounter when applying disparate im-
pact theory to an employer who "innocently" adopts an em-
ployment practice that has a disparate impact,59 this Note
focuses on disparate impact theory.
1. Historical Perspective of Disparate Impact Theory
Since the Supreme Court first enunciated the disparate im-
pact theory of liability in 1971, 60 lower courts have applied the
theory inconsistently.61 Although recent Supreme Court opin-
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity").
55. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
56. To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, a claim-
ant must show that: (1) she belongs to a racial minority; (2) she applied and
was qualified for the position; (3) despite qualifications, she was rejected; (4)
after rejection, the position remained open and the employer sought similarly
qualified applicants. The employer then must show a legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reason for the rejection. Claimant then has an opportunity to show
that the stated reason was just a pretext. Id. at 802-06. See also Carino v. Uni-
versity of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 818-20 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying
McDonnell standard to national origin discrimination); Native-Born Acadians,
supra note 36, at 1162-64 (discussing McDonnell standard). Under Title VII,
the employer must show that disparate treatment is justified by a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1982). See also Com-
ment, Language Discrimination Under Title V1I. The Silent Right of National
Origin Discrimination, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 667, 672 (1982) [hereinafter
Silent Right] (discussing BFOQ defense).
57. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
58. See id. at 431 (stating that Title VII proscribes practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation).
59. The Supreme Court's recent reformulation of the disparate impact
standard in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), is just
one example of the difficulty courts have in distinguishing the disparate im-
pact theory from the disparate treatment theory. See infra notes 159-94 and
accompanying text. The Supreme Court's inconsistency has fostered the con-
fusion found in lower courts. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
60. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
61. See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text. See generally B. SCHLEI
& P. GROSSMAN, supra note 52, at 1328-29 (discussing business necessity stan-
dard requirements in various courts). Various commentators have noted the
differing interpretations of business necessity found in the lower courts. E.g.,
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ions62 finally may resolve many of these inconsistencies, it is
helpful in understanding past English-only decisions to ex-
amine the lower courts' varying approaches to disparate impact
theory. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth,6 3 Seventh,6 and
Tenth6 5 Circuits have applied a two-step standard to evaluate
the validity of an employment practice challenged as having a
disparate impact. The first step requires the plaintiff to estab-
lish a prima facie66 case of disparate impact. The second step is
an affirmative defense that shifts the burden to the employer
to prove a business necessity for the practice.6 7 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that once an employee proves disparate im-
pact, the employer must show that a sufficiently compelling
business purpose exists to override the discriminatory impact of
the alleged discriminatory rule, that the rule effectively carries
out the stated purpose, and that there are no acceptable, less
discriminatory alternatives. 68 The Seventh Circuit has held
that when an employer fails to comply with the EEOC guide-
lines, the employer bears a heavier burden of proving the busi-
ness necessity of the rule than when in compliance.69 The
Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Stan-
dards, 15 GA. L. REV. 376, 386-400 (1980) [hereinafter Judicial Dualism] (dis-
cussing lower courts' interpretation of Griggs standard); Comment, The
Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46
U. Cm. L. REv. 911, 918-20 (1979) (same). The EEOC Guidelines on Discrimi-
nation Because of National Origin also do not define clearly the various com-
ponents of disparate impact theory. The Guidelines merely state that the rule
must be "justified by business necessity" without defining that requirement
further. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (1987).
62. See infra notes 155-82 and accompanying text (discussing recent
Supreme Court decisions).
63. See infra note 68.
64. See infra note 69.
65. See infra notes 70-71.
66. "A prima facie case consists of sufficient evidence... to get plaintiff
past a motion for directed verdict in a jury case or motion to dismiss in a non-
jury case ...." BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 1071 (5th ed. 1979).
67. The majority of cases dealing with employment practices involve em-
ployee selection and promotion devices. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra
note 52, at 304 n.2.
68. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The court held that the seniority system violated
Title VII under disparate impact theory. 444 F.2d at 795-96. The court be-
lieved that maintaining the status quo, conforming to precedent, and avoiding
union pressure were not legitimate business purposes that would override the
adverse racial impact. Id. at 798-800. Although efficiency is a legitimate busi-
ness interest, the court found that the seniority system was an inefficient
means to assure sufficient prior job experience for advancements. Id. at 799.
69. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 427 (7th Cir. 1978). On
remand, the court required the employers to make a strong showing that the
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Tenth Circuit has held that the employer must prove business
necessity for an employment practice and that the practice is
"essential, the purpose compelling."70 A rational or legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment practice is not
sufficient.71
Other circuits have rejected this two-step standard and
found that the employee bears the burden of persuasion at all
times,72 or that the employer does not have to prove that the
employment practice is "absolutely necessary" or "essential." 73
The Supreme Court has promoted this lower court confu-
sion by announcing inconsistent standards.74  The Griggs
Court7 5 simply stated that once the plaintiff establishes the dis-
parate effect of the employment practice, the employer has the
burden of showing that the practice has a "manifest relation-
ship" to a "genuine business need. '76 Later, in Albemarle Pa-
per Co. v. Moody, the Supreme Court altered the Griggs
"manifest relationship" standard by adding a third step.77 Af-
ter the employer demonstrates a manifest relationship to a gen-
uine business need, the employee may demonstrate that less
employment practice used to award promotions was predictive of successful
performance on the job. Id. at 427-28.
70. Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir.
1981); see also Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015 (2d Cir.
1980) (adopting Supreme Court's stricter tripartite standard), cert denied, 452
U.S. 940 (1981).
71. Williams, 641 F.2d at 842. The court noted that for disparate treat-
ment cases, unlike disparate impact cases, all that is needed is proof of a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason to rebut an inference of intent. Id. The court
remanded the case "[i]n light of the district court's misapplication of 'disparate
treatment' standards to this 'disparate impact' claim." Id.
72. Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
73. Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, 645 F.2d 1251, 1261-62 (6th Cir.
1981) (noting "indispensability is not the touchstone" of business necessity).
74. See generally Judicial Dualism, supra note 61, at 400-19 (discussing
Supreme Court's interpretation of Griggs business necessity component).
75. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
76. Id. at 432. This case involved employee selection devices having a dis-
parate impact on the basis of race. The test for discrimination required proof
that the practice had an adverse impact on a protected class and the absence of
proof that the practice resulted from business necessity. Id. at 431. The em-
ployer failed to prove that the high school completion requirement and the
general intelligence test bore a demonstrable relationship to the successful
performance of the jobs. Evidence showed that employees who had not com-
pleted high school or who had not taken the general intelligence test per-
formed their jobs satisfactorily. Id.
77. 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). The Court also stated that the issue of job re-
latedness must be viewed within the context of the business. Id. at 427. In
this case, the employer did not meet the burden of proving the job relatedness
of its testing program. Id. at 435-36.
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discriminatory alternatives exist to serve the employer's legiti-
mate interests.78 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this tripartite
standard7 9 in 1977,80 but stated that the employer bears the bur-
den of proving that the practice is "essential" to its business.8 1
In 1979, the Supreme Court affirmed the Griggs "manifest rela-
tionship" standard, but weakened it by stating that a rule
would be valid if it "significantly served" the "legitimate em-
ployment goals of safety and efficiency. '8 2
The Court's recent decisions in Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust8 3 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio" ap-
pear to resolve some of these inconsistencies. Before discussing
the Court's newest enunciation of the disparate impact stan-
dard and its implications for the proper analysis of English-only
rules, it is useful to discuss challenges to English-only rules
under prior case law.
2. Judicial Application of Disparate Impact Theory to
English-Only Rules
When an employer uses an English-only rule to discrimi-
nate intentionally against members of a national origin group,
the employer violates Title VII under disparate treatment anal-
ysis.8 5 Disparate impact theory, however, recognizes that some
78. Id. at 425. Even validated tests may be a pretext for discrimination if
less discriminatory alternatives exist. Id. at 436.
79. The Albemarle standard involved three steps. First, the employee
must show that the employment practice selects "applicants for hire or promo-
tion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of appli-
cants." Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425. Second, the employer must prove that the
employment practice has a "manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion" or that the employment practice is "job related." Id. Finally, the em-
ployee may show that less discriminatory alternatives exist. Id.
80. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). In this case, height
and weight requirements had a disparate impact on gender. Id. at 331. The
employer was unable to show job relatedness, and even if related, less discrim-
inatory alternatives existed, such as a test that directly measured an individ-
ual's strength. Id. at 331-32. The Court suggested that a strength requirement
would satisfy Title VII standards only if strength is essential to a correction
counselor's effective job performance. Id. The Second Circuit adopted this
standard in 1981. Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1014-15 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
81. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331.
82. New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (hold-
ing valid rule that denied methadone users employment as drivers).
83. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988). See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
84. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). Atonio is discussed infra notes 159-82, 187-91
and accompanying text.
85. Disparate treatment theory recognizes that employers who adopt em-
ployment practices with the intent of discriminating against "protected
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employment practices, adopted without a discriminatory mo-
tive, may be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimina-
tion.8 6 Before Atonio,8 7 plaintiffs established a prima facie case
of national origin discrimination under disparate impact theory
by showing that an English-only rule affected employees of a
certain national origin in a manner significantly different from
other employees.8 8 Plaintiffs have used statistical comparisons
to show the disproportionate effect.8 9 Courts have focused on
the consequences or effects of the practice, rather than on the
employer's motive.90 If an employee established a disparate im-
pact, the employer then had to rebut the claim by showing a
business necessity for the English-only rule.91 Finally, depend-
ing on the circuit, either the employer or the employee had to
show that less discriminatory alternatives were or were not
equally effective.92
The Supreme Court's failure to clearly define disparate im-
pact theory has resulted in lower courts applying business ne-
cessity standards in English-only cases that range from
"understandable and not irrational" 93 to "compelling and essen-
classes" violate Title VII. See, e.g., M. PLAYER, supra note 43, § 5.40(b), at 327
(stating that "if consideration of . . . national origin caused, incited, or
prompted the decision, the action violates Title VII").
86. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2785 (1988).
87. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
88. See B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 52, at 1325 (stating that
court must determine whether the "practice or selection device has a substan-
tial adverse impact upon a protected group"); cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (applying disparate impact theory to racial dis-
crimination claim).
89. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 52, at 1326-28 (discussing
statistical proof).
90. E.g., id. at 1324 (stating that focus is on consequence, not motive).
91. The employer has the burden of showing that the particular employ-
ment practice has a "manifest relationship" to the employment. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). "The touchstone is business ne-
cessity." Id. at 431. See also Silent Right, supra note 56, at 673 n.27, 687 (stat-
ing that proof of business necessity depends on job-relatedness and whether
the job related practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of busi-
ness). Necessity implies least restrictive alternative. Id. at 673-74 & n.30 (not-
ing that pretext for unlawful discrimination may be shown if less restrictive
alternative available).
92. Compare Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (finding burden on plaintiff) with
Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding
burden on defendant).
93. The "understandable and not irrational" standard appears even
weaker than a rational basis standard. Under this standard, courts apparently
always find the proffered justifications valid. See, e.g., Flores v. Hartford Po-
lice Dep't, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 180, 186 (D. Conn. 1981) (holding
that absolute no-Spanish rule at Police Academy did not violate Title VII:
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tial.' ' 94 Some courts apply an intermediate balancing test, ex-
amining the proffered justifications without articulating a
standard, and reaching unpredictable results.95
EEOC decisions have recognized that an employer may not
institute a rule prohibiting non-English languages "at all times"
in the workplace or institute any language restrictions absent a
business necessity.9 Under disparate impact theory, the EEOC
has held that an employer who denies employees the privilege
of conversing in their native language discriminates between
"Even if the rule could not be shown to be job related, it is an understandable
and not irrational response.... ."); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir.
1980) (noting that judges should defer to employer's business judgment), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
94. Under the "compelling and essential" standard, proffered justifica-
tions usually are invalid. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1041-44
(9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting all proffered justifications), vacated as moot 109 S. Ct.
1736 (1989).
95. The courts sometimes find that the proffered justifications are valid.
See, e.g., Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing English-only rule justified by marketing and rating concerns of radio pro-
gram); Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 921 (S.D. Tex.
1979) (implying that court would uphold English-only rule during actual drill-
ing of wells); Commission Decision No. 83-7, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1861, 1862 (EEOC 1983) (holding that English-only rule justified by necessity
of safe and efficient operation of petroleum refinery laboratory).
Courts in other cases have rejected the proffered justifications. See, e.g.,
Saucedo, 464 F. Supp. at 922 (holding that Spanish rule had disparate impact
on Mexican-American employees of oilfield drilling operation because safety
justification not relevant at time employee violated rule); Commission Deci-
sion No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820, 1822 (EEOC 1981) (find-
ing that English-only rule for tailor shop employees not justified by fellow
employee and customer preference); Commission Decision No. 71446, 2 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127, 1128 (EEOC 1970) (rejecting business necessity
justification for absolute no-Spanish rule).
96. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1820, 1822 (EEOC 1980) (holding English-only rule at all times in tailor
shop not justified by business necessity); see also Commission Decision No.
71446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127, 1128 (EEOC 1970) (finding em-
ployer offered no evidence of business necessity for absolute English-only
rule). The Commission held that a rule prohibiting Spanish on the work
premises had an obvious effect on Spanish surnamed American employees and
discriminated on the basis of national origin. Id. The Commission has found
such a rule unlawful particularly when the employer does not offer any busi-
ness necessity for the rule. Id. Another decision held that it is unlawful for a
labor union and an employer of a food processing company to prohibit employ-
ees from speaking their native language during work hours and at union meet-
ings. Commission Decision No. 73-0479, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1788,
1804, 1807 (EEOC 1973). The Commission held that the prohibition discrimi-
nated against Spanish surnamed Americans on the basis of national origin,
noting that 19% of the employees had Spanish surnames. Id.
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groups on the basis of national origin.9 Before 1980, the only
court to address the issue of English-only rules held that an
oilfield drilling operation unlawfully discharged a Mexican-
American employee who violated an informal rule by speaking
two words of Spanish.9 8 The court found that the employer's
absolute prohibition on Spanish had a disparate impact on Mex-
ican-American employees and that no business necessity ex-
isted at the time the employee violated the rule.99 In 1980, the
court reached the opposite conclusion in Garcia v. Gloor.10°
a. Garcia and its Progeny
The Fifth Circuit held in Garcia v. Gloor'0 1 that a limited
English-only rule neither imposed a discriminatory condition of
employment nor constituted national origin discrimination
under Title VII.1 0 2 The rule at issue in Garcia prohibited
employees from speaking Spanish on the job except during
breaks 0 3  or when communicating with Spanish-speaking
97. Commission Decision No. 73-0479, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1788, 1804 (EEOC 1973) (stating that "[t]o prohibit . . . Spanish surnamed
American employees and members from speaking their native tongue ... op-
erates to deny them a privilege of employment... enjoyed by Anglos. .. .");
Commission Decision No. 71446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127, 1128
(EEOC 1970) (noting that rule denies "Spanish surnamed American employees
... a... privilege of employment enjoyed by other employees: to converse in a
familiar language with which they are most comfortable").
98. Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
99. Id. at 922. There was no evidence of intentional discrimination. Fifty
percent of the employees were Mexican-Americans in a community population
that was comprised of 30% Mexican-Americans. Id. at 920. The court found
that the rule forbidding Spanish obviously had a disparate impact on this
group. Id. at 922. The court's ruling, however, is very narrow. It found that
the rule had not been clearly promulgated or uniformly enforced. Id. at 921.
In addition, the employee was not engaged in drilling at the time he violated
the rule. For this reason, the court found there was no business necessity for
the rule as applied to the employee. Id. at 922.
In dicta, however, the court found that a rule prohibiting the use of Span-
ish during the drilling of a well "would be a reasonable rule for which a busi-
ness necessity could be demonstrated." Id. at 921. The court found that
operating an oil drilling rig was a highly skilled, dangerous activity that re-
quired close coordination of the members of the crew. Id.
100. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 268-71. The employee challenged the workplace rule under Title
VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(c). This Note examines only the Title VII
claim.
103. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 266. The rule did not apply to non-English-speak-
ing employees who worked outside in the lumberyard. Id.
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customers.' 4
The court held that the workplace rule did not violate Title
VII. Based on the plain language of Title VII and the absence
of an EEOC administrative interpretation, the court found that
Congress did not intend to equate language preference with na-
tional origin.105 The court also noted that Title VII does not
prohibit all arbitrary employment practices, only those based
on immutable characteristics or those that impose burdens on a
prohibited basis, such as race or national origin.106 The court
held that although national origin is immutable, language pref-
erence, like hair length preference, is mutable, 0 7 and thus
should not be given the same protection as immutable
characteristics. 0 8
The court found no disparate impact on the basis of na-
tional origin because the plaintiff, who was bilingual, could
have complied easily with the rule by speaking English.10 9 For
the plaintiff, noncompliance with the rule was a matter of per-
sonal preference, rather than an inability to speak English."0O
The court also found no evidence that the rule created a bur-
densome condition of employment or that it produced an at-
mosphere of racial and ethnic oppression.I n
The court also held that even if the rule did have a dispa-
rate impact on Hispanics, valid business reasons justified the
rule. These included customer" 2 and supervisor'1 3 preference,
104. Id. at 266. Garcia, a bilingual salesperson, violated the rule by re-
sponding in Spanish to a question from a fellow Mexican-American employee
about the availability of a product. An officer of Gloor overheard Garcia's
Spanish response and discharged him. Id.
105. Id. at 268 & nn.1-2. The court based its ruling in part on the fact that
even though the EEOC had considered the lawfulness of these rules in specific
instances, the EEOC had not adopted a regulation or a general policy specifi-
cally prohibiting them. Id. at 268 n.1. The EEOC published the 1980 Guide-
lines on English-only rules after the Garcia decision and the Guideline's
commentary makes reference to Garcia. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,632, 85,635 (1980).
The court did not support the proposition that a person has a right to speak
whatever language one wants at work. Garcia, 618 F.2d. at 268. The court also
noted that national origin was not to be confused with ethnic or sociocultural
traits. Id. at 269.
106. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269.
107. Id. at 269-70.
108. Id.
109. Id- at 270.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The rule was necessary to calm English-speaking customers who ob-
jected to overhearing conversations they could not understand. Id. at 267.
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and improving employees' English fluency. 114 These justifica-
tions met the Fifth Circuit's lenient business necessity test" 5
and the court failed to examine them in detail." 6
Post-Garcia cases generally have upheld limited English-
only rules either by finding no disparate impact because the bi-
lingual employee could comply easily,117 or by finding that busi-
ness necessity justified the rule." 8 Courts usually find that the
proffered justifications satisfy the business necessity stan-
dard.1 9 For example, courts have found it lawful to require
English to improve trainees' English proficiency even during
class breaks in a police training academy; 2 0 to require English
to promote safety in a laboratory where employees work with
potentially dangerous chemicals;' 12 and to require a radio disc
jockey to speak only English on the air because of demographic
and marketing concerns.2 2
113. By requiring employees to speak English at all times, the supervisors
would be better able to oversee their subordinates' work. Id.
114. By requiring employees to speak English at all times, not just in deal-
ing with customers, the Spanish-speakers' English would improve faster and
they would be better able to understand the trade literature available only in
English. Id.
115. "Fifth Circuit cases decided after Beazer and Contreras have imposed
a less strict standard than business necessity upon defendants seeking to show
that their selection devices are job related." Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 841 F.2d
547, 563 (5th Cir. 1988). The Bernard opinion further states that the standard
is the less strict Albemarle "significantly correlated" standard. Id. at 563-64.
See also Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 1002 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding
that policy removing pregnant attendants from flight duty does not violate Ti-
tle VII under disparate impact theory because the policy was justified by
safety concerns, and less discriminatory alternatives were available but too
burdensome).
116. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 266, 271.
117. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that a radio disc jockey who could easily comply with radio station's Eng-
lish-only order had no basis for disparate impact claim).
118. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
119. Although the majority of the cases from 1981 to 1987 find the prof-
fered justification sufficient to meet business necessity, the Commission has
found that fellow employee and customer preference for hearing English did
not justify a rule that forbids English during work hours in a tailor shop.
Commission Decision No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820, 1822
(EEOC 1981). Following the EEOC guidelines, the court closely scrutinized
the rule and found it discriminated on the basis of national origin. Id.
120. Flores v. Hartford Police Dep't, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 180,
186 (D. Conn. 1981).
121. Commission Decision No. 83-7, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1861,
1862 (EEOC 1983).
122. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1987).
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b. The Gutierrez Standard
In 1988 the Ninth Circuit rejected the Garcia analysis in
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court,1 -2 holding that the English-only
rule at issue had a disparate impact on a national origin group
and that business necessity did not justify the rule's use.-A In
1989, the Supreme Court vacated this decision as moot, without
explanation.125 By providing no explanation, the Supreme
Court thus gives lower courts no guidance concerning the
proper disposition of challenges to English-only rules.
The English-only rule in Gutierrez prohibited court em-
ployees from speaking any language other than English except
when acting as court translators or during breaks and
lunches.12 6 The plaintiffi2 7 challenged the rule as national ori-
gin discrimination with respect to a term or condition of em-
ployment under Title VII.28 The Gutierrez court upheld a
preliminary injunction preventing the employer from imposing
and enforcing this rule. 2 9 The court applied a two-step dispa-
rate impact standard. It first determined that the rule had a
disparate impact and then examined and rejected the proffered
business necessity justifications in light of Title VII. 30
In determining whether the rule had a disparate impact,
123. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as
moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
124. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1044. In February, 1989, the county settled with
Ms. Gutierrez for $85,000. Holguin, High Court Asked to Act on Banning of
Spanish, L.A. Times, March 15, 1989, § 9, at 1, col. 1.
125. Municipal Ct. v. Gutierrez, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989). This decision was
vacated prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
126. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1037. In 1984, the Municipal Court promulgated
a rule that prohibited employees from speaking any language other than Eng-
lish except when translating in court. Id. at 1036. The court subsequently
amended this rule to exclude conversations during lunches and breaks. Id.
The rule as amended read: "The English language shall be spoken by all court
employees during regular working hours while attending to assigned work du-
ties, unless an employee is translating for the non-English-speaking public.
This rule does not apply to employees while on their lunch hour or work
breaks." Id. at 1037.
127. Gutierrez was an Hispanic-American court translator. Unlike earlier
cases, Gutierrez was not discharged for violation of the rule, but filed a com-
plaint with the EEOC and later filed an action challenging the rule's validity.
Id. at 1036. Gutierrez brought the action against the municipal judges who in-
stituted the rule. Id.
128. Id. at 1036. Gutierrez relied on both disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories. Id. at 1037. In addition, Gutierrez claimed the rule vio-
lated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(c), as well as the first and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 1036.
129. Id. at 1036.
130. Id. at 1038-44.
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the court found that "English-only rules generally have an ad-
verse impact on protected groups and . . . should be closely
scrutinized.'' 1 1 The court equated national origin with lan-
guage, based on the 1987 EEOC Guidelines, which state that
language is an "'essential national origin characteristic.' "132
The court also found that language restrictions must be moni-
tored carefully because language is an identifying characteristic
of national origin and may be a pretext for intentional national
origin discrimination.133 The court found this particular rule a
burdensome condition of employment because it regulated both
work and non-work related communications between
employees.'1
The court adopted the EEOC Guidelines' business necessity
standard 35 and the Fourth and Tenth Circuit's interpretation
of business necessity 3 6 to determine whether the discrimina-
tory effect of the limited English-only rule was justified. The
court examined in detail the business purpose and the effective-
ness of the rule in carrying out that purpose, rejecting each jus-
tification that the employer proffered 3 7 Although the court
acknowledged a substantial state interest in having an English-
speaking country, the court found that the rule at issue did not
effectively achieve that result.1as Similarly, the court rejected
the argument that the employer needed the rule to prevent the
office from becoming a "Tower of Babel,"'13 9 finding that intra-
employee Spanish communications were unlikely to create any
greater disruption than already existed.140
The court also found that the rule was not necessary for
131. Id. at 1040. The court rejected the defendant's argument that because
Gutierrez was bilingual and could easily comply with the rule there was no
burden and no disparate impact. Id. at 1041. "The mere fact that an employee
is bilingual does not eliminate the relationship between his primary language
and the culture that is derived from his national origin." Id. at 1039.
132. Id. at 1039 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1987)).
133, Id.
134. Id. at 1040. The court agreed with the EEOC's conclusion that Eng-
lish-only rules have a direct effect on the workplace by creating an atmos-
phere of "'inferiority, isolation, and intimidation."' Id. at 1040 (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1987)).
135. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1040 & nn.8-9.
136. Id. at 1041-42. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
137. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1041-44.
138. Gutierrez's official duties as an employee of the court included using
Spanish in translating for the non-English-speaking public. Id. at 1043. The
prohibition of intra-employee Spanish communications, therefore, did not ef-
fectively promote a single language system. Id. at 1042.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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supervisors to determine whether information was being cor-
rectly disseminated to the public.141 The nature of the work
(translating in court) required employees to communicate with
the public in Spanish.1' The court thus suggested that employ-
ing Spanish-speaking supervisors would be the most effective
means to supervise employees. 14 3 The court also found that the
rule was not necessary to promote racial harmony,144 and in
fact, only increased the racial hostility among employees be-
cause the Hispanic employees felt the rule degraded them. 45
Similarly, the rule was not necessary to allay the fears and sus-
picions of the non-Spanish-speaking employees who believed
they were the subject of discussion in Spanish. 46 The court
found no probative evidence that employees were using Spanish
to talk about other employees.147 The court finally rejected the
argument that the California Constitution, amended in 1986 to
make English the official language of the state,148 created a
141. Id. at 1043 (describing argument that rule is necessary to monitor em-
ployees' work as "illogical" and "unpersuasive").
142. Id. The office served a multilingual public and the employer required
the employees to use Spanish as part of their official duties as court transla-
tors. I&
143. Id.
144. The employers contended that Spanish had previously been used to
belittle non-Spanish-speaking employees. Id. at 1042. There was, however, no
evidence of any inappropriate use of Spanish. Id.
145. Id. There was some evidence that the Hispanics felt belittled by the
regulation and that non-Spanish-speaking employees directed derogatory re-
marks at the Hispanics. Id.
146. Id. at 1042-43.
147. Id.
148. California voters added the official-English amendment to the Califor-
nia Constitution as a ballot initiative. Id. at 1043. Section 6 provides:
(a) Purpose
English is the common language of the people of the United
States of America and the State of California. This section is intended
to preserve, protect and strengthen the English language, and not to
supersede any of the rights guaranteed to the people by this
Constitution.
(b) . . . English is the official language of the State of California.
(c) EnYforcement
The Legislature shall enforce this section by appropriate legisla-
tion. The Legislature and officials of the State of California shall take
all steps necessary to insure that the role of English as the common
language of the State of California is preserved and enhanced. The
Legislature shall make no law which diminishes or ignores the role of
English as the common language of the State of California.
(d) . . . Any person who is a resident of or doing business in the
State of California shall have standing to sue the State of California
to enforce this section ....
CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6.
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business necessity.1 49
The Supreme Court's recent decision to vacate Gutierrez as
moot gives no guidance to lower courts on the validity of the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning or on the proper analysis to be used
in determining whether English-only rules have a disparate im-
pact on members of national origin groups.150 A district court
decision of July, 1989, however, suggests that the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning remains valid.15 ' The court enjoined Pomona,
California, from enforcing an ordinance that required busi-
nesses with signs using foreign alphabetical characters to
devote 50% of the sign space to English.152 As in Gutierrez, the
court found that language is an expression of national origin
and that the ordinance "overtly discriminates on the basis of
national origin. ' u1 3
3. Recent Developments in Disparate Impact Theory
Until 1988, all of the Supreme Court's decisions using dis-
parate impact theory involved objective, standardized employ-
ment tests or hiring criteria.'4 In 1988, the Supreme Court
expanded the scope of the theory's application in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, holding that disparate impact theory
also applies to subjective employment practices. 155 Although
the Court affirmed the earlier Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody
tripartite standard,156 a plurality of the Court heightened the
evidentiary standards for the plaintiff.157 The plurality's shift,
149. The court found that the California constitutional amendment was
largely symbolic and made a distinction between official and private communi-
cations. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1044. The adoption of the amendment did not
ipso facto create a business necessity. Id. The rule still must meet the busi-
ness necessity standard. Id.
150. The court simply stated that U.S. English Foundation, Inc. filed an
amicus brief and that the case was remanded to be dismissed as moot. Gutier-
rez, 109 S. Ct. at 1736.
151. Asian Am. Business Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D.
Cal. 1989). In discussing the first amendment claim, the court favorably cited
Gutierrez for the proposition that discrimination based on language constitutes
discrimination based on national origin. Id. at 1330.
152. Id. at 1332. The court used strict scrutiny for the equal protection
claim under the fourteenth amendment.
153. Id.
154. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2785 (1988).
155. Id. at 2786.
156. Id. at 2790.
157. The Court stated that the plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima fa-
cie case goes beyond showing statistical disparities. Id. at 2788. The plaintiff
must first identify the specific employment practice responsible for the dispar-
ity and then prove causation. Id. Sufficiently substantial statistical disparities
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in what appears to be dicta, foreshadowed the Court's recent
reformulation of disparate impact theory. 58
Attempting to clarify the disparate impact theory of liabil-
ity, the Supreme Court in 1989 reformulated the standard in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.159 Although the Court did
not have to reach the issues of burden of proof and business ne-
cessity,160 it nevertheless addressed them.
The Court first recharacterized the burden of proof and
distinguished the burden of production and burden of persua-
sion.161 The Court clearly stated that the plaintiff bears the
burden of persuasion even after establishing a prima facie case
of disparate impact.162 The burden of persuasion does not shift
may raise an inference of causation. Id. at 2789. The employer then may dis-
credit the statistics or meet the burden of proving business necessity. Id. at
2789-90. The employer meets its burden by showing that its "employment
practices are based on legitimate business reasons." Id. at 2790. The Court
also stated that it is less competent than employers to judge the relationship
between practices and legitimate business purposes. Id. at 2791 (citing Furnco
Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 568 (1978)). After the employer has met
this burden, the plaintiff must show the availability of less discriminatory al-
ternatives. Id. at 2790.
158. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788 & n.2, 2791. This change in the evidentiary
standards appears to be dicta. The Court stated that heightened standards of
proof must accompany the extension of disparate impact theory to subjective
practices. Id. at 2788 & n.2. The Court feared that without these safeguards,
employers would adopt quotas or engage in preferential treatment, a danger
that the Supreme Court and Congress recognized and sought to avoid. Id. at
2788 & n.2, 2791. The Court appeared to confuse burden of proof, burden of
persuasion, and the business necessity defense. A three justice concurring
opinion pointed out that the plurality's position is the standard for disparate
treatment cases, not disparate impact cases. Id. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). The concurring opinion stated that in disparate impact cases, it is "up to
the employer to prove that the discriminatory effect is justified." Id. at 2794.
Furthermore, the concurring opinion pointed out that the plurality was not
correct in implying that the defendant need simply show that the employment
practice is based on "legitimate" business reasons. Rather, the practice must
be essential and the least discriminatory alternative available. Id. at 2794-95.
159. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). The Court applied the tripartite Albemarle
standard as modified in Watson, with further modifications. Id. at 2126.
160. The Court remanded the case to determine whether the plaintiff
could make out a prima facie case using other statistics. Id. at 2125. The Court
found the plaintiff had used the wrong set of statistics to prove the disparate
impact of the employment practices on race. Id. at 2121-24. The issues of bur-
den of proof and business necessity were not properly before the Court and
the Court should not have addressed them. A court may properly consider
such issues only after a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case.
161. Id. at 2126. The Court first distinguished and reallocated the burden
of proof. The Court found that the employer's burden of proof is only the bur-
den of production and the employee's burden of proof is the burden of persua-
sion, which remains with the plaintiff at all times.
162. Id To establish a prima facie case under the Atonio disparate impact
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to the defendant to prove business necessity. 6 3 Instead, the
employer bears only the burden of producing evidence of a
business justification for the challenged business practice.'6
Once the employer produces such evidence, the plaintiff must
show that no such justification exists.165 The Court stated that
placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff in disparate
impact cases conforms to the allocation of burdens in disparate
treatment cases.' 66 The Court further stated that, to the extent
the lower court's decision in the case suggested that the burden
of persuasion shifts to the employer, the decision was "clearly
erroneous."' 67 The Court acknowledged, however, that the
new standard contradicted some of its own earlier decisions.168
As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, the majority
blurred the distinction between disparate treatment and dispa-
rate impact.169 Courts recognize that the employer bears a light
burden in disparate treatment cases,170 but in past disparate im-
pact cases, once the plaintiff established a prima facie case,±71
standard, a plaintiff must identify a specific employment practice and prove
that the practice caused the observed statistical disparities or demonstrated
disparate impact. Id. at 2124.
163. Id. at 2126.
164. Id.
165. See id In the alternative, the plaintiff may prove that other less dis-
criminatory alternatives are available and "equally effective" in achieving the
employer's business goals. Id. at 2126-27. The employer no longer bears the
burden of showing that no less discriminatory alternatives exist when justify-
ing the practice. Id.
166. Id. at 2126. The burden of persuasion is a heavier burden than that of
producing evidence. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing dis-
parate treatment).
167. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
168. Id. (stating that "[w]e acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions
can be read as suggesting otherwise"). The Court claimed that earlier cases
discussing the shifting of the burden of proof with regard to the business justi-
fication defense should be "understood to mean an employer's production-but
not persuasion-burden." Id.
169. Id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens accused the ma-
jority of "failing to explore the interplay between these two distinct orders of
proof." Id. at 2132.
170. See id. at 2130-31. Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that in
disparate treatment cases the burden of persuasion stays with the plaintiff at
all times and only the burden of production shifts to the employer. Id. Justice
Stevens further pointed out that in disparate treatment cases, the employer
simply must come forward with evidence of a legitimate business purpose. Id.
This requirement is very easily met.
171. Id at 2131. When the plaintiff establishes that a specific employment
practice caused the discrimination and that the discrimination is "because of"
the individual's race or national origin, the plaintiff has met the burden of
proving unlawful conduct. Id. at 2126.
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employers escaped liability only by proving that the discrimina-
tory effect nevertheless was justified.172 Justice Stevens noted
that the Supreme Court and other federal courts have repeat-
edly recognized business necessity as an affirmative defense to
an otherwise illegal course of conduct.173 Justice Stevens ar-
gued that the employer's burden, which before Atonio included
both the burden of production and persuasion, is always
"weighty."'174 The Court's decision in Atonio, however, elimi-
nates any doubt whether business necessity is an affirmative
defense that requires the employer to satisfy the burden of
persuasion. 7 5
The majority held that to satisfy the business necessity re-
quirement, the employer need only show that the "challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment
goals of the employer."'176 This burden is considerably more le-
nient than proving an "essential and compelling" business pur-
pose.'7 7 The Court stated that there is no requirement that the
practice be "essential" to the employer's business. 7 8 The Court
also stated that "a mere insubstantial justification" will not suf-
fice.' 79 Although pointing out that this standard requires a
"reasoned review"' 8 0 and is not a "low standard,'' the Court
suggested that courts may be less competent than employers
themselves to evaluate business practices. 8 2
172. Id. at 2131.
173. Id. at 2130 & n.14.
174. Id. at 2132.
175. See id. at 2128-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (tracing the development of
business justification as affirmative defense and noting majority's rejection of
development of past statutory construction following Griggs).
176. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26. The Court stated that "it is generally
well-established that at the justification stage of such a disparate impact case,
the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant
way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer." Id.
177. See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text (discussing "essential-
ness" requirement for business justification).
178. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126. See also id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(observing that majority eliminates "essentialness" requirement).
179. Id. at 2126. "A mere insubstantial justification in this regard will not
suffice because such a low standard of review would permit discrimination to
be practiced through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment prac-
tices." Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2127.
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II. PROPOSED APPLICATION OF THE NEW
DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
The Supreme Court's recent decisions necessarily will af-
fect the way lower courts evaluate the validity of English-only
workplace rules. Unfortunately, the decisions further cloud the
proper application of the disparate impact theory of liability.
The following proposal recognizes the analytical problems in-
herent in the new formulation of the disparate impact theory
and illustrates how courts should apply the new formulation to
English-only rules.
A. ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY RECENT DECISIONS
It is not clear what the Supreme Court intended when it
vacated on grounds of mootness the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court.183 The Court's decision has the
effect of precluding courts from using Gutierrez as legal prece-
dent. 84 The Court's silence, however, leaves uncertain the va-
lidity of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. 8 5 Consequently, lower
courts in future "English-only cases" may rely on the legal ar-
guments used in equating language with national origin and re-
jecting certain business justifications. 8 6 The 5 to 4 decision in
Atonio, on the other hand, marks a shift in the Supreme
183. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as
moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989). The case could have been held moot for several
reasons, among them the fact that the plaintiff was no longer an employee of
the court or that a settlement had been reached. See B. PIATT, supra note 4, at
71.
184. Gutierrez, 109 S. Ct. at 1736 (citing United States v. Munsingwear, 340
U.S. 36, 37 (1950)). The Court in Munsingwear stated that vacating an appeal
is a method to "prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from
spawning any legal consequences." United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36,
41 (1950).
185. The Court, however, indicated that the Ninth Circuit erroneously allo-
cated the burden of persuasion in Atonio. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
186. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042-44. See also Asian Am. Business Group
v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (noting that "[a]
person's primary language is an important part of and flows from his/her na-
tional origin"). This case was decided after Atonio and held that a city ordi-
nance requiring business signs in foreign languages to include English
translations violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 1332-33. The court rea-
soned that the "use of foreign languages is clearly an expression of national
origin. As such, the ordinance overtly discriminated on the basis of national
origin." Id. at 1332. The court also stated that although it was not relying on
Gutierrez as precedent, it agreed with the case's rationale and analysis. Id. at
1330. See also B. PIATr, supra note 4, at 72 (stating that Gutierrez "is still per-
suasive for other language rights cases which will undoubtedly follow").
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Court's view of the disparate impact standard. 8 7 It remains un-
clear, however, whether the Atonio opinion reflects the Court's
confusion over the distinctions between disparate treatment
theory and disparate impact theory or whether it reflects the
Court's deliberate retreat from established doctrines.
The convergence of the two theories in Atonio, neverthe-
less, raises analytical problems. Even though the Court reallo-
cated the burden of persuasion and diluted the employer's
business necessity burden, it still requires the employer to show
more than a legitimate business purpose. 8 The employer
must prove that the practice furthers business goals in a "sig-
nificant way."' 8 9 Even though the Court places a heavy burden
on plaintiffs and "tip[s] the scales in favor of employers,"'190 the
Court requires lower courts to conduct a "reasoned review" of
the employer's justifications and not simply defer to them.' 9 '
How courts should interpret the phrases "legitimate," 192 "in a
significant way,"'193 and "reasoned review" 194 is certainly un-
clear. The measure of protection the Court intends to afford
national origin groups in the context of English-only rules
under the disparate impact theory is equally unclear. The fol-
lowing analysis proposes a method for applying the new stan-
dard to English-only rules.
B. ESTABLISHING A PRmA FACIE CASE OF NATIONAL ORIGIN
DISCRIMINATION
Under the Supreme Court's new formulation of disparate
impact theory, a plaintiff challenging an employer's practice
must identify the specific employment practice and prove that
it has a disparate impact on members of a national origin
group.195 It is relatively easy for the plaintiff to identify the
oral or written English-only rule or policy.196 Proving the cau-
187. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
188. Cf. id. at 2125-26 (stating that the dispositive issue is whether chal-
lenged practice serves legitimate employment goals "in a signifiant way"
(emphasis added)).
189. Id. at 2125.
190. Id. at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
192. Id at 2125. The Court later stated that "legitimate" means more than
a "mere insubstantial justification." Id. at 2126.
193. Id. at 2125.
194. rd. at 2126.
195. Id at 2124.
196. But see supra note 22 (noting that hospital denied existence of oral
rule).
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sation element, that English-only rules disproportionately af-
fect members of national origin groups, however, is more
difficult. This Note argues that courts should recognize a re-
buttable presumption that English-only rules burden members
of national origin groups. In the alternative, even if courts fail
to recognize this rebuttable presumption, individual plaintiffs
still can prove the disparate impact of English-only rules in
their particular work environment.
1. Presumption of Impact
To establish a prima facie disparate impact case, a plaintiff
must show that the English-only rule disproportionately affects
members of national origin groups.197 Because English-only
rules by nature have an impact on members of national origin
groups in the general population, courts should not require
each plaintiff to prove such impact. Courts instead should rec-
ognize and adopt a rebuttable presumption that English-only
rules have an inherent and significant adverse impact on em-
ployees belonging to certain national origin groups.198 The pre-
sumption is rebuttable because an employer may show that in
its particular workplace the rule has an equal effect on "pro-
tected" national origin employees and "non-protected" employ-
ees.199 A rebuttable presumption that English-only rules have
a disparate impact on national origin is proper because lan-
guage may be equated with national origin.200
197. Cf Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2124 (stating that plaintiff must show causal
link between challenged practice and disparate impact).
198. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopt-
ing proposition that English-only rules have adverse impact and should be
closely scrutinized), vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989). One commentator
advocates abandoning the concept that "forces protection of language rights
into the 'national origin' pigeon hole." See B. PiATr, supra note 4, at 901. That
author states that using a "'national origin' fiction" is analytically unsound.
Id. In light of the fact that courts have been reluctant to recognize a constitu-
tional basis for protecting language rights, supra notes 28-29, this Note argues
that courts should adopt the EEOC Guidelines' broad rule equating language
with national origin and a rebuttable presumption that English-only rules
have an adverse impact on national origin. See infra notes 199-240.
199. Title VII's "protected" groups include race, color, national origin, sex,
and religion. M. PLAYER, supra note 43, § 5.01, at 199. Under national origin
discrimination, Title VII protects "hyphenated-Americans," such as Italian-
Americans and Hispanic-Americans. Id., § 5.24, at 232. This Note uses the
term "non-protected" employees to refer to Anglos. In certain situations An-
glos may be protected, however, as when an Hispanic employer discriminates
against the Anglo employees. Id.
200. See infra notes 201-15; see also Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039 (noting that
language is an important aspect of national origin); Olagues v. Russoniello, 797
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Courts should recognize a theory equating language with
national origin because courts have interpreted Title VII to pro-
hibit discrimination based on certain characteristics that iden-
tify national origin,201 including surname, accent, or heritage of
spouse.20 2 Courts, for example, have held that because foreign
accent flows from national origin,203 discrimination based on
foreign accent constitutes national origin discrimination in vio-
lation of Title VII.20 4 By analogy, courts should accept the
premise that Title VII also prohibits discrimination because of a
person's language. Language, like accent, flows from national
origin and is a characteristic that may indicate national ori-
gin.20 5 Discrimination on the basis of language, therefore,
should constitute discrimination on the basis of national origin
in violation of Title VII.
A theory equating language with national origin also is de-
sirable because there is an obvious statistical correlation be-
tween a language and its corresponding national origin group.
There is a close connection, for example, between most linguis-
tic minorities, such as Chinese or Spanish, and the correspond-
ing national origin. Language often is a function of the country
F.2d 1511, 1520-21 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that language skill flows from na-
tional origin, nationality distinguished by foreign language) vacated for moot-
ness, 484 U.S. 806 (1987); Asian Am. Business Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F.
Supp. 1328, 1330, 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (observing that language flows from na-
tional origin; foreign language is expression of national origin).
201. See, e.g., Carino v. University of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815,
816, 819 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding finding that employee, naturalized U.S. cit-
izen born in Philippines, was improperly demoted on basis of national origin
because of noticeable foreign accent, although accent did not interfere with
ability to perform job).
202. M. PLAYER, supra note 43, § 5.24, at 232, 236. The EEOC considers
several national origin factors when determining the propriety of a denial of
an employment opportunity. These include marriage to persons belonging to
certain national origin groups, association with organizations identified with
national origin groups, attendance in churches used by national origin groups,
and surname. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1987); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 85,632, 85,632-
33 (1980) (providing commentary to § 1606.1).
203. See Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Public Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir.
1980) (finding Polish immigrant was impermissibly denied promotion because
of accent that flowed from national origin, despite above average command of
English).
204. See iL at 981-82. The courts in both Carino and Berke found that
under Title VII, discrimination on the basis of foreign accent constitutes na-
tional origin discrimination. See Carino, 750 F.2d at 819; Berke, 628 F.2d at 981.
205. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039. The Gutierrez court agreed that both
language and accents are identifying characteristics of national origin. Id. See
also Asian Am. Business Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328, 1330
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (noting that Gutierrez effectively addressed relationship of
language regulations to national origin).
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from which a person or his ancestors came, and therefore is an
essential characteristic of national origin.20 6
Employers may argue that courts should not equate lan-
guage with national origin because a theory equating language
with national origin to prove discrimination is both overinclu-
sive and underinclusive. Such a theory is acceptable, however,
with English-only rules. At most, it is overinclusive to an ex-
tremely limited degree because, for example, it may include
some speakers of Chinese who are not Chinese. Because, how-
ever, 89% of all adults in the United States speak only Eng-
lish,207 the vast majority of those who do speak Chinese will be
Chinese. A theory equating language with national origin to
prove discrimination is underinclusive because it will not in-
clude members of national origin groups who speak only Eng-
lish. This is not a problem, however, because English-speaking
minorities can use other means to prove national origin
discrimination.208
A theory equating language with national origin also is de-
sirable because the use of a "foreign language" may identify a
person's national origin group.209 An employer's restrictions on
language use thus may be "a covert basis for national origin dis-
crimination." 210 Courts should recognize that if they fail to
equate language with national origin, employers could easily
circumvent the protections of Title VII by rewording English-
only rules in a facially neutral manner. For example, an em-
ployer who institutes a rule requiring Hispanic employees to
speak only English violates Title VII under disparate treatment
analysis. The rule constitutes intentional discrimination be-
cause it explicitly names a national origin group. The same em-
ployer, however, can reword the rule so that it is facially
neutral by requiring all employees to speak only English. This
version is not facially discriminatory, yet only affects Hispanic
206. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039. See also Piatt, supra note 17, at 885 (argu-
ing for recognition of human right to language); Silent Right, supra note 56, at
667 (discussing lawsuits based on language discrimination).
207. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
208. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 52, at 304-05 & nn.1-2, 313-
16 (discussing proof of national origin discrimination resulting from other dis-
criminatory employment practices, including derogatory remarks and mini-
mum height standards).
209. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039 (finding that use of foreign language
may identify individual as having specific national origin).
210. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (1981).
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employees. The fact that both rules have the same impact illus-
trates the need to equate language with national origin.
Finally, courts should recognize a theory equating language
with national origin because the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimi-
nation Because of National Origin2 1 L support such an interpre-
tation. The EEOC Guidelines broadly define national origin to
include linguistic characteristics of a national origin group and
mandate a careful scrutiny of English-only rules.2 12 Courts
should adopt these EEOC Guidelines because they further the
goals of Title VII and do not contravene congressional intent.213
Because Title VII defines neither national origin nor the scope
of protection for national origin groups, courts may infer that
Congress did not intend to restrict its meaning. Furthermore,
Congress gave the EEOC authority to enforce Title VII and the
Supreme Court validated the EEOC's authority to promulgate
interpretive guidelines. 21 4 Courts should find that the EEOC
Guidelines protect employees from workplace rules that may
subject employees to discharge on the basis of national origin,
thus furthering the goals of Title VII.2 1 5 Despite the Supreme
Court's recent narrow interpretation of Title VII, English-only
rules fall within the letter of Title VII because they subject
members of national origin groups to possible discharge.
In addition, no legal precedent prohibits courts from adopt-
ing the EEOC Guidelines in the context of English-only rules.
The Garcia decision antedates the 1980 EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of National Origin.21 6 In upholding the
English-only rule, the Garcia court based its decision on the
211. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)-(b) (1987). For text, see supra note 51.
212. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1987) (defining national origin discrimination
broadly to include denial of equal employment opportunity because of place of
origin or because individual has physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics
of national origin group).
213. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982) (setting forth powers of EEOC).
Although the Supreme Court has adopted other EEOC interpretive guidelines
in the past, EEOC guidelines may be subject to court interpretation and subse-
quent administrative revision. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
To avoid agency revision, the guidelines must be consistent with Title VII and
congressional intent. Id.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982). Although Title VII did not equate language
with national origin, Congress gave the EEOC authority to enforce Title VII,
and the Supreme Court validated the EEOC's authority to promulgate inter-
pretive guidelines. See supra note 43.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). See supra note 33 (reprinting text of
§ 2000e-2).
216. The EEOC Guidelines, promulgated after the Garcia decision in 1980,
discuss Garcia. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,632, 85,635 (1980) (providing supplementary
material discussing Guidelines) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1981)).
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
plain language of the statute.217 The court noted that no EEOC
regulation or general policy equating national origin with lan-
guage existed.21 8 In 1988, the Ninth Circuit became the first
court to adopt the EEOC Guidelines for evaluating the lawful-
ness of an English-only rule.21 9 Although the Supreme Court
vacated Gutierrez, it was silent on whether lower courts should
adopt the EEOC Guidelines.2 20 Therefore, because no "cogent
reason exists for non-compliance," 221 courts should defer to the
EEOC Guidelines and adopt them as the standard for evaluat-
ing the validity of English-only rules.
For the above reasons, courts should recognize and adopt a
theory that equates language with national origin and adopt a
rebuttable presumption that English-only rules have an adverse
impact on national origin groups.
2. Proof of Impact
Even if courts are reluctant to adopt a rebuttable presump-
tion that English-only rules discriminate based on national ori-
gin, a plaintiff still can prove that the employer's English-only
rule has a disproportionate impact on members of national ori-
gin groups. English-only rules violate Title VII because they
create burdens for the majority of employees belonging to na-
tional origin groups,22 2 burdens not created for the majority of
"non-protected" employees.22 3 Employees whose native lan-
217. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449
U.S. 1113 (1981).
218. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 268 & n.1.
219. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated
as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
220. Gutierrez, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989). The Supreme Court could have held
that the EEOC Guidelines were inconsistent with congressional intent, as it
did in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973), and instructed the
EEOC to revise the Guidelines, narrowing the definition of national origin to
exclude linguistic characteristics.
221. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
222. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against or discharg-
ing an individual with respect to conditions of employment because of national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
223. See Commission Decision No. 71446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1127, 1127 (EEOC 1970). The court found that the English-only rule had an
obvious and clear effect on Spanish surnamed employees and denied them a
"term, condition, or privilege of employment enjoyed by other employees." Id.
Prohibiting employees from speaking their native language is similar to re-
quiring a bilingual employee to use her native language on the job, even when
such use is not part of the job description. Both place burdens on bilingual
employees. The EEOC recently filed suit against a Los Angeles corporation
claiming that the added, uncompensated responsibilities of translating Spanish
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guage is not English bear the burden of possible reprimand or
termination for violating the rule.22 Employees who speak
only English bear no burden because employers can never ter-
minate them for violating the rule.22 5 When a group protected
under Title VII has a higher risk of incurring penalties under a
rule, the rule has an adverse impact on that group.22
Employees can use statistics to show that English-only
rules are conditions of employment that burden a significantly
higher percentage of "protected employees" than "non-pro-
tected" employees. 227 An English-only rule would burden a na-
tional origin group when statistics demonstrate that the rule
burdens a high percentage of employees belonging to a certain
national origin group and a low percentage of "non-protected"
employees. This would be the result even though an employer
may have a few monolingual English-speaking "protected" em-
ployees or a few bilingual "non-protected" employees.228 An
place burdens on bilingual employees and constitutes national origin discrimi-
nation. EEOC v. Contel Serv. Corp., SACV 89-506 AHS (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 3,
1989). See also Baker, A Tale of Two Languages Translates into a Lawsuit,
Mpls. Star Tribune, Oct. 1, 1989, at 1J, col. 1 (discussing Contel lawsuit).
224. See supra note 22 (demonstrating that English-only rules usually sub-
ject employees to reprimand and possible termination). See, e.g., Garcia v.
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 265 (5th Cir. 1980) (examining salesman discharge for an-
swering fellow Spanish speaker's questions in Spanish), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (1981); Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 921-22 (S.D.
Tex. 1979) (examining worker discharge for uttering casual Spanish phrase);
Commission Decision No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820, 1822
(EEOC 1980) (examining seamstress discharge resulting from customer com-
plaint that she spoke Spanish during fitting); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813
F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1987) (examining radio announcer discharge for occa-
sional use of Spanish on the air).
225. M. PLAYER, supra note 43, § 5.24, at 235 (stating that "the ability to
speak and understand English obviously favors those of an Anglo heritage and
disadvantages those who are reared in a non-Anglo environment").
226. Cf. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270 (observing that neutral employment crite-
ria might be forbidden if the criteria could cause discriminatory impact). The
Garcia court rejected the argument that a rule has discriminatory impact just
because Hispanic-Americans are more likely to violate the rule and the group
has a higher risk of incurring penalties. Id. The court found that because Gar-
cia could readily comply with the rule and noncompliance was a matter of
choice, the rule did not have a disparate impact. Id.
227. Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (noting
that evidence that racial pattern of hiring differs significantly from applicant
pool makes out prima facie discrimination case). The Court's discussion of sta-
tistics in Atonio dealt with hiring practices and thus may not be helpful in the
English-only rule context. See Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2121. The Court stated
that the proper comparison in that context is between the racial composition
of the qualified labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs. Id.
228. Based on the assumption that a person's primary language identifies
national origin, see Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1521 (9th Cir. 1986),
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English-only rule would not violate Title VII when statistics
show that it burdens an equal percentage of "protected" em-
ployees and "non-protected" employees. This would be the re-
sult both when an employer has many monolingual English-
speaking "protected" employees and when many bilingual
"non-protected" employees.
English-only rules impose a further burden on national ori-
gin groups because employees who are not native English
speakers must consciously and continuously monitor their
speech. These rules also allow some employees to speak their
native language, while prohibiting others from doing the same.
When employers deny some, but not all, employees the right to
speak their native language, those employees may feel isolated
and inferior in the work environment. 229 These additional bur-
dens illustrate an adverse impact even on those protected em-
ployees who are bilingual.
Although using statistics or other means to prove disparate
impact is more difficult than proving impact under a rebuttable
presumption, plaintiffs still can prove impact without the bene-
fit of the presumption.
3. Mutability
Employers may argue that English-only rules are not bur-
densome conditions of employment because language is a muta-
ble characteristic (one that changes over time), and thus not
protected under Title VII.2 30 Indeed, the Garcia court found
vacated for mootness, 484 U.S. 806 (1987), an employee may prove disparate
impact negatively. To do so, the employee compares the class of employees
who could never violate the rule (employees who are monolingual speakers of
English) with the class of employees who could potentially violate the rule
(employees whose native language is not English). Although some members
of a "protected" national origin group may not speak the corresponding lan-
guage, or some native speakers of English may be bilingual, the greatest ad-
verse impact of the rule falls on those employees whose native language is not
English.
229. Cf. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042, 1045 (noting that plaintiff produced ev-
idence that imposition of English-only rule contributed to work atmosphere
that derogated Hispanics).
230. See Silent Right, supra note 56, at 691 (noting no undue burden on bi-
lingual employees). One critic feels that an employer can regulate the use of
non-English languages by any bilingual employee, regardless of the employer's
motive or intent. Id. The reason is that language is similar to other mutable
characteristics that neither the Constitution nor Title VII protects. See, e.g.,
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975)
(observing that grooming codes are mutable characteristic within employer's
control); Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 249 (1976) (noting that employers may
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that restrictions on language did not violate Title VII, reasoning
that language is mutable and therefore undeserving of protec-
tion.231 Following precedent, the Garcia court recognized that
mutable characteristics that are easily changed, such as hair
length, fall outside the protection of Title VII even if an em-
ployment practice based on such characteristics has a disparate
impact on a protected group.232 The court's consideration of
"mutability" was improper for two reasons.233 First, mutability
is irrelevant in this context. Disparate treatment cases have re-
jected the mutability argument and found that Title VII pro-
tects characteristics of national origin, such as foreign accent or
surname, despite mutability.2 34 If the Supreme Court intends
to converge the theories of disparate treatment and disparate
impact, then the analysis courts have applied in accent cases
must be applied in English-only cases. In other words, Title VII
should protect language, despite its mutability, in disparate im-
pact cases.
Second, it is inappropriate to compare language with muta-
ble characteristics such as hairstyle. Language is more closely
analogous to religion. Both are "mutable," yet both go to the
core of the person and are not as easily changed as hairstyle.23 5
Learning a language is humankind's most complex intellectual
achievement.236 Although people can speak and comprehend
limit hair length of police officers). But see Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269 n.5 (citing
characteristics that Court protects that are not strictly immutable).
231. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269. The court found that Title VII, save for reli-
gion, "focuses its laser of prohibitions" on those characteristics that are beyond
the victim's power to alter or that impose burdens on a "prohibited basis." Id.
But see id. at 269-70 n.6 (stating that "we need not here explore the extent to
which the EEO Act forbids discrimination based on characteristics that are not
immutable").
232. Id. at 269 (arguing that EEO Act does not prohibit all arbitrary em-
ployment practices, only those based on race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin). The court stated that national origin should not be confused with eth-
nic or sociocultural traits. Id.
233. See Davis, 'Garcia v. Gloor" Mutable Characteristics Rationale Ex-
tended to National Origin Discrimination, 32 MERCER L. REV. 1275, 1279-82
(1980) (criticizing mutable-immutable characteristics rationale).
234. See, e.g., Carino v. University of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819
(10th Cir. 1984) (employee's accent at issue); Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Public
Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 1980) (same). The Carino and Berke courts
did not find that mutability of foreign accent precluded a finding of
discrimination.
235. See generally M. PLAYER, supra note 43, § 5.26 at 256-66 (discussing
mutable characteristics as applied in Title VII).
236. J. FALU, LINGuiSTIcs AND LANGUAGE 4-5 (1973). See B. PIATr, supra
note 4, at 156 (noting that "language constitutes a sort of logic" that "molds
the thoughts of its users"). "Language is a mental phenomenon, a body of
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their native language with little thought of the mental and
physical processes involved,2S7 language greatly influences the
way one views the world and the way one describes events.sS
Although a person may learn another language, and thereby
learn to view the world differently, the connection between the
mental process and native language still exists.2 9 Although
reaching opposite ultimate conclusions, both Garcia and Gutier-
rez recognized that language preference is an important factor
of national self-identification.2 0 Religion, despite its mutabil-
ity, receives statutory and constitutional protection.2 1 Lan-
knowledge about sounds, meanings and syntax that resides in the mind." Id.
at 12. Fournier pointed out 100 years ago that "[s]peech is the only window
through which the physiologist can observe the workings of the cerebral life."
V. FROMKIN & R. RODMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 28 (1978) (quot-
ing Fournier). Language allows the accumulation of knowledge and transmis-
sion of culture. B. PEARSON, INTRODUCTION TO LINGUISTIC CONCEPTS 3 (1977).
237. J. FALK, supra note 236, at 1. The system of one's native language and
the knowledge of one's native language is far below one's consciousness. Id.
"Language is so rooted in the whole of human behavior that it may be sus-
pected that there is little in the functional side of our conscious behavior in
which language does not play its part." Id. at 159. "Language is a rudiment of
consciousness and close to the core of personality; deprivations in relation to
language deeply affect identity." McDougal, supra note 27, at 151.
238. See LANGUAGE, CULTURE & PERSONALITY 92 (L. Spier, A. Hallowell &
S. Newman eds. 1941). Language shapes the perception of such concepts as
"time," "space," and "matter." Id. By shaping the way people arrange data
and analyze phenomena, language influences people culturally and personally.
Id. at 75. Benjamin Lee Whorf's thesis, influenced by Edward Sapir, claims
that languages with different structural categories compel their respective
speakers to view the world in totally different ways. B. PEARSON, supra note
236, at 150. See also Piatt, supra note 17, at 895-97 & n.65 (discussing Whorf's
thesis and relationship between language and one's view of the world). Lan-
guages contain vocabularies that differ vastly in nature. One language may ig-
nore distinctions made in another language. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 155, 166 (1935).
239. See Piatt, supra note 17, at 895; see also Karst, supra note 16, at 307-10
(observing that language goes to core of personhood as well); cf. Gutierrez v.
Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating'that one's primary
language remains an important link to ethnic culture and identity), vacated as
moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
240. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that "we
do not denigrate the importance of a person's language of preference or other
aspects of his national, ethnic or racial self-identification"), cert denied, 449
U.S. 1113 (1981); Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039 (observing that language is an im-
portant aspect of national origin). "Language is the lifeblood of every ethnic
group. To economically and psychologically penalize a person for practicing
his native tongue is to strike at the core of ethnicity." Native-Born Acadians,
supra note 36, at 1167.
241. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 52, at 206-45 (discussing protec-
tions afforded religion). Even though characteristics of sex and religion are
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guage, as a proxy for national origin, deserves at least statutory
protection.
In summary, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of
national origin discrimination by claiming a rebuttable pre-
sumption of impact or by proving that an English-only rule has
a discriminatory impact. In this analysis, courts should find
that mutability is irrelevant either because Title VII protects
characteristics of national origin despite mutability or because
language is more closely analogous to religion, which receives
statutory and constitutional protection.
C. PROVING BUSINESS NECESSITY AN) LESS DISCRIMINATORY
ALTERNATIVES
Under the Supreme Court's new formulation of the dispa-
rate impact standard, after the plaintiff establishes a prima fa-
cie case of disparate impact, the employer must produce
evidence of a business justification sufficient to justify that ef-
fect. 2 Under the Atonio standard, the employer must not only
produce evidence of "legitimate" business reasons for the Eng-
lish-only rule, but also must show that the rule serves those
goals in a "significant way. '2 4 3 "Insubstantial justifications" do
not suffice. 2 " Courts must conduct a "reasoned review" of the
legitimacy of the employer's justification as well as examine the
relationship between the justification and the English-only
rule.24 5 Atonio indicates that the Court still believes the stan-
dard must be high enough to invalidate those rules that result
from both "innocent" discrimination and intentional but
masked discrimination.2 4 6
Once the employer meets the burden of production, the
not strictly "immutable," Title VII also protects them. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1982).
242. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26 (1989).
243. See id. at 2125.
244. Id. at 2126.
245. Id.
246. Cf. id. (arguing that insubstantial justification will not suffice; stating
that Court will not permit "spurious, seemingly neutral employment prac-
tices"). The standard must be strict enough to prohibit employers from per-
petuating historical societal discrimination by barring protected groups from
employment opportunities. Cox, Substance and Process in Employment Dis-
crimination Law: One View of the Swamp, 18 VAL. U.L. REv. 21, 46 (1984).
The business necessity test also requires a standard of proof that eliminates
neutral practices that may mask an intent to discriminate on a prohibited ba-
sis. See id. This standard assumes an individual right to be free of considera-
tions of group membership and a group right to employment opportunities
free from societal discrimination. Id. at 46-47.
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plaintiff must either disprove the business justification or
demonstrate less discriminatory alternatives.24 7 Showing that
the business goal is not "legitimate" or that the English-only
rule does not "significantly" serve that goal disproves the busi-
ness justification. Alternatively, plaintiffs must persuade the
trier of fact that an alternative practice is "equally effective" in
achieving a "legitimate" business goal.248
The following analysis applies the "business necessity"
prong of the disparate impact standard to non-safety and safety
justifications that employers often offer.
1. Non-Safety Justifications
To determine whether an English-only rule significantly
furthers a legitimate employment goal, courts must examine
the rule's scope24 9 and the type of work environment in ques-
tion.250 For example, under this standard, an English-only rule
regulating non-work related conversations between employees
rarely will "significantly serve" an employer's "legitimate"
business purposes. 2 1 It is difficult to imagine a situation that
would permit an employer to regulate the language the em-
ployees speak during their lunch hour, because at such times
the employer has a greatly reduced interest in employees'
behavior.25 2
In conducting a "reasoned review," courts must do a case-
247. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
248. Id. at 2127.
249. The rule may be limited, applying only to work related conversations
and official duties, or be absolute, applying even to casual office conversations
and breaks. E.g. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 103641 (9th Cir.
1988) (noting that employer amended absolute English-only rule to exclude
breaks and lunches; finding rule sweeping in nature), vacated as moot, 109 S.
Ct. 1736 (1989).
250. There are two general types of work environments: 1) nonhazardous
office environment, see, e.g., Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036 (court), Jurado v.
Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1987) (radio station), Garcia v.
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980) (store), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981), Commission Decision No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820,
1821 (EEOC 1981) (tailor shop); and 2) hazardous or high likelihood of emer-
gency environment, see, e.g., Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp.
919, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (well drilling), Commission Decision No. 83-7, 31 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1861, 1862 (EEOC 1983) (chemical laboratory).
251. After Garcia, one court surmised that Puerto Ricans in a police acad-
emy could be required to speak English at all times because proficiency in
English was a necessary goal. Flores v. Hartford Police Dep't., 25 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 180, 186 (D. Conn. 1981).
252. The commentary to the 1980 EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of National Origin states that if a rule applies "at all times," the Com-
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by-case analysis of English-only rules that regulate only work
related conversations. Employers commonly cite personnel
problems to justify English-only rules.s 3 An English-only rule,
however, is too drastic a measure to deal with ordinary person-
nel problems, such as camaraderie and morale.2 Employers
claim, for example, that English-only rules are necessary to as-
suage employees' fears and suspicions.255 Some employees sus-
pect that other employees use another language to talk about
them and to conceal the substance of their conversations.256
Although an employer should be sensitive to employees' con-
cerns, including fear or discomfort from hearing languages they
do not understand, such concerns are not sufficiently legitimate
to justify benefiting one group of employees while imposing
burdens on protected national origin groups.257 Employers
should handle such personnel problems on an individual basis
with the employees involved. Even assuming, arguendo, that
these reasons are legitimate, an English-only rule does not "sig-
nificantly serve" the goal of easing employee discomfort be-
cause it merely shifts the "discomfort" from workers who
speak only English to those who speak other languages. An
English-only rule also does not significantly serve the goal of
improving employee morale or of promoting camaraderie be-
cause such a rule "belittles"2 8 and further divides employees.
If the goal is to prevent employees from gossiping about other
mission presumes that it violates Title VII. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,635 (1980) (codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1981)).
253. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 861 F.2d 1187, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order denying rehearing en banc) (noting
employer's claim that rule instituted because of hurt feelings and tensions be-
tween employees).
254. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1820, 1821-22 (EEOC 1981) (observing that rarely will there be need for
absolute English-only rule). In situations such as these, "specific problems...
have specific solutions which do not require an absolute prohibition against
speaking any language other than English in the workplace." Id.
255. See, e.g., Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042-43 (noting employer's claim that
allowing employees to speak Spanish intimidates non-Spanish-speaking
employees).
256. See, e.g., id. at 1042 (noting that employer argued that non-Spanish-
speaking employees contended that Hispanics used Spanish to convey discrimi-
natory or insubordinate remarks); see also Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 861 F.2d
1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order deny-
ing rehearing en banc) (noting that English-only rule adopted after complaint
by black employee that Spanish increasingly used to conceal substance of
conversations).
257. See, e.g., Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1043 (stating that fears or prejudices do
not constitute business necessity for rule that burdens protected class).
258. Id. at 1042.
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employees, such a rule is ineffective because employees still
may whisper in English to conceal the substance of their
conversations.
The "Tower of Babel" justification fares no better.259 The
mere fact that some employees find conversations in other lan-
guages distracting does not justify an English-only rule. Casual
conversations in English may equally distract fellow employees.
If the goal is to eliminate distractions, a rule limiting casual
conversations in general serves that goal in a significant way
and is a less discriminatory alternative because its burden falls
equally on all employees.
A related justification, promoting racial harmony among
coworkers, presents the same issues. English-only rules rarely
will effectively promote that end.260 These rules usually in-
crease distrust and animosity among groups by creating an at-
mosphere of inferiority and intimidation. 26 1 The employer
must produce sufficient evidence that the English-only rule in
fact "significantly serves" the goal of fostering racial
harmony.26 2
In both hazardous and nonhazardous work environments,
improving employees' English fluency may not necessarily be a
legitimate business interest. Courts should recognize that if an
employer hires certain employees on the premise that they are
able to perform their jobs satisfactorily given their existing
level of English, there can be no business necessity that re-
quires a higher level of fluency.263 Employers must demon-
strate that improving employees' English fluency is a
"legitimate employment goal" for the business. In the absence
of a business justification, it should not be sufficient that an
employer merely "wants" employees to improve their language
259. See, e.g., id. (arguing that additional Spanish not likely to create
greater disruption because Spanish already spoken in workplace).
260. See id. (noting that employer produced no evidence to support argu-
ment that rule fostered racial harmony).
261. See, e.g., id. (noting that evidence indicated that Hispanics felt belit-
tled by regulation and indicated rule increased racial hostility); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7 (1987) (stating that English-only rules may create an "atmosphere of
inferiority, isolation and intimidation").
262. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d. at 1042 (noting that employer failed to produce ev-
idence to support argument that English-only rule fosters racial harmony).
263. Cf. M. PLAYER, supra note 43, § 5.24, at 235 (arguing against finding
business necessity if English test measures ability beyond that needed for com-
munication). By the same token, if an employer's business necessity requires
employees to be bilingual, it is unreasonable to conclude that business neces-
sity also requires an English-only rule. Cf. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1043.
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abilities. "The touchstone is business necessity.' '26 Moreover,
other less discriminatory methods exist to improve employees'
English fluency. Classes or tutoring in English would more ef-
fectively promote employee fluency with a less discriminatory
effect.265
Employers also claim that English-only rules ensure that
supervisors can monitor the employees' work.266 Even if moni-
toring employees' work is a legitimate business interest, an
English-only rule may not "significantly serve" that goal. To
prove that requiring employees to speak English "significantly
serves" that goal, employers must produce sufficient evidence
that listening to employees' conversations while performing of-
ficial duties is the method used to monitor employees' work.26 7
Employers commonly use other methods, such as visual obser-
vation, quality control checks, or hiring supervisors who speak
the same language,268 to monitor employees' work. An em-
ployer does not need an English-only rule to ensure that an em-
ployee uses English to communicate with the supervisor.
Common sense dictates that the employee will speak to the su-
pervisor in a language common to both.
Under the recently announced Atonio standard, many jus-
tifications for English-only rules are not "legitimate" or do not
"significantly serve" employment goals. Courts, therefore,
must carefully scrutinize English-only rules to preclude the use
of unjustified rules.
2. Safety Justifications
It may appear that English-only rules designed to promote
and insure the safety of employees, such as requiring employ-
ees to use only English while drilling a well or working with
dangerous chemicals, always are valid.269 The commentary to
264. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
265. This analysis invalidates the police training academy rule in Flores
that prohibited Spanish even during after-class breaks. The rule does not "sig-
nificantly serve" a "legitimate" business goal. The Flores court commented
that "[e]ven if the rule could not be shown to be job related, it is an under-
standable and not irrational response" to the problem. Flores v. Hartford Po-
lice Dep't, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 180, 186 (D. Conn. 1981) (emphasis
added).
266. E.g., Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1043 (noting that employer contended that
supervisors could not monitor employees unless English was spoken).
267. Cf. id (rejecting this argument because rule did not enable supervi-
sors to evaluate employees' work more effectively).
268. See id. (suggesting employing Spanish-speaking supervisors).
269. See supra notes 98-99 and 121. See also Note, Business Necessity
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the EEOC Guidelines states that English-only rules may be jus-
tified when safety requires all communications in English.270
Atonio's disparate impact standard requires courts to examine
whether the English-only rule "significantly" serves the legiti-
mate employment goal of safety in the particular business con-
text.271 Courts must apply the test carefully to eliminate
"safety" rules that are a pretext for discrimination.
In hazardous or potentially hazardous work environments
or in emergency situations, safety is always a legitimate busi-
ness interest.272 Even in these situations, however, courts
should not regard English-only rules as valid per se. In some
situations a rule allowing employees to speak their native lan-
guage actually may promote safety and efficiency. Employees
who are permitted to use their native language may feel more
comfortable and work more efficiently. When a given work
task requires coordination of effort and clear communication, a
narrowly-tailored rule requiring employees to speak the lan-
guage common to all employees involved in the task may pro-
mote safety most effectively.273
In fact, an English-only rule actually may increase the dan-
ger in a true emergency because some employees may react
faster in a language that is not English.274 Courts, however,
may uphold an English-only rule during work hours in those
work environments that involve explosives or other dangerous
substances or that require continuous verbal coordination be-
tween employees.275 If employees are accustomed to using Eng-
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84
YALE L.J. 98, 107, 108 & n.48 (1974) (stating that "safety and efficiency are the
essence of a valid business purpose").
270. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,635 (1980) (supplementary information) (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1981)).
271. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26 (1989).
272. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,635 (1980) (supplementary information) (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1981)). The EEOC Guidelines recognize safety as a legitimate
business interest when "safety requires that all communications be in English
so that everyone can closely follow a particular task, such as surgery or drill-
ing of oil wells." Id.
273. Again, if an employee uses a language not common to the group when
a task demands clear communication, the employer should handle this "per-
sonnel" problem on an individual basis, rather than instituting an English-only
rule.
274. It is assumed that all employees possess a functional level of English.
It also is unfair to reprimand or terminate an employee who blurts out some-
thing in her native language, a natural reaction to an emergency.
275. See supra note 272.
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lish on the job, the likelihood of using English in an emergency
increases, thus promoting a safer work environment.
In nonhazardous work environments, however, "safety"
rules more often are a pretext. In these environments, English-
only rules may not be necessary to promote and ensure em-
ployee safety. An employer must produce sufficient evidence
that an English-only rule "significantly serves" the employ-
ment goal of safety in a nonhazardous work environment. The
employer must show more than a rational relationship between
the rule and "safety."'276 Again, assuming the employer meets
this burden of production, a plaintiff may show that allowing
employees to speak their native language actually promotes
safety in the workplace because employees communicate more
accurately and efficiently in their native language.
Courts must carefully apply the Supreme Court's new busi-
ness necessity standard to carry out effectively the purpose and
intent of Title VII. This Note demonstrates that courts must
examine the legitimacy of each proffered justification and the
relationship between it and the English-only rule, even when
the proffered justification is "safety."
CONCLUSION
An increasing number of employers have instituted Eng-
lish-only rules prohibiting languages other than English in the
workplace. In addition, an increasing number of states have de-
clared English the official state language. Members of national
origin groups whose native language is not English view these
actions as evidence of discrimination.
Recently, the Supreme Court has issued several decisions
that call into question the measure of protection that Title VII
affords employees in the workplace. By vacating as moot the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, the
Supreme Court leaves undefined the proper analysis for deter-
mining whether English-only rules violate Title VII on the ba-
sis of national origin discrimination. The Supreme Court's
decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio reformulates the
disparate impact standard for judging the validity of employ-
ment practices. This decision also demonstrates the persistent
analytical problems that courts encounter when applying a the-
ory of liability that does not require proof of discriminatory in-
tent or motive.
276. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
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This Note argues that even in light of these recent deci-
sions, Title VII protects national origin groups from "innocent"
employers who institute English-only rules. Courts should fol-
low the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Na-
tional Origin that equate language with national origin and
recognize a rebuttable presumption that English-only rules
have a disparate impact on national origin.
Courts also should find that English-only rules create a
burden on members of national origin groups, even those who
are bilingual, because they still bear a higher risk of incurring
penalties than do employees who speak English as their pri-
mary language. Finally, this Note illustrates how courts should
apply the new disparate impact standard to English-only rules.
Under the new standard, employers must produce sufficient ev-
idence of a "legitimate" business necessity and sufficient evi-
dence that the English-only rule "significantly serves" that
goal.
By adopting the EEOC Guidelines, as well as a presump-
tion that English-only rules have a disparate impact on national
origin, and by conducting a "reasoned review" of the proffered
business necessity, courts will preclude the unjustified use of
facially neutral language restrictions that impose burdensome
conditions of employment on national origin groups. In the
process, courts will further the important values underlying Ti-
tle VII.
Linda M. Mealey
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